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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the self-settled special needs pooled
trust, a relatively new option available to elder law attorneys, estate
and trust lawyers, and other legal practitioners serving disabled or
injured elderly clients. It also examines the legal ethics involved in
various initial client-lawyer engagements where the trust specialist is
being engaged to design, implement, and fund such a trust, raising
questions of lawyer loyalty and conflict of interests, confidentiality,
and privity running to the trustee, the beneficiary or both.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SELF-SETTLED SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST
A. The Discretionary Support Trust
The self-settled special needs trust emanated from the
discretionary support trust, a vehicle that has been well-defined for
1
generations. The discretionary support trust is created to provide
the trustee unqualified power to pay the beneficiary a certain
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
discretionary trust).
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amount of the income and capital of the trust, or to pay nothing at
2
all. The beneficiary has no way to access or control the trust
interest whose character, even more than the express declarations
3
of the settlor, may prevent alienation or attachment. Historically,
the nature of the discretionary support trust gives the beneficiary
no assignable interest before the trustee distributes any portion of
4
the income or principal to the beneficiary. Once there is
distribution, however, the distributed income or property is
5
exposed to claims of creditors of the beneficiary. Generally, to
overcome the reach of attachment or creditor claims, spendthrift
6
clauses are made a part of the trust. Spendthrift clauses are a
standard of practice among elder law, estate planning and trust and
7
estate lawyers.
When the beneficiary creates the discretionary trust, it is
8
defined as a self-settled discretionary trust. Such a trust vehicle has
9
rarely been a safe harbor for asset protection against creditors.
Less protected has been the self-settled trust that a person creates
when attempting to insulate resources from state agencies
operating means tested benefit programs prior to the person
10
qualifying for those programs.
B. The Special Needs Trust
Historically the special needs trust (“SNT”) evovled from the
2. See GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 113 (4th ed. 1963).
3. Id. at 114 (citing Calloway v. Smith, 186 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Ky. 1945)).
4. See A.W. SCOTT & W.F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 155 (4th ed. 1987)
(citing McNiff v. Olmsead County Welfare Dept., 287 Minn. 40, 44 , 176 N.W.2d
888, 892 (1970)).
5. This was the general policy across the country prior to 1997. In 1997, the
statutory Self-Settled Discretionary Spendthrift (“SSDS”) trust was enacted in
Alaska, and followed in 2000 by Nevada and Rhode Island with their own statutory
SSDS trusts. See David G. Shaftel, Newest Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of
Alaska Trusts, ESTATE PLANNING Feb. 1999 (citing Jonathan G. Blattmachr &
Howard Zaritsky, North to Alaska–Estate Planning Under the New Alaska Trust Act, 32
U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. (1998)); Jeffery N. Pennell, 1997 Current
Estate Planning Developments, THE S. CAL. TAX & EST. PLAN. FORUM (1997)).
6. See BOGERT, supra note 2, at 114.
7. See ROBERT WHITMAN & DAVID M. ENGLISH, FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING AND
TRUST ADMINISTRATION GUIDE § 17.3 at 175 (ALI-ABA 2002).
8. See CLIFTON B. KRUSE, JR., THIRD PARTY AND SELF-CREATED TRUSTS 3 (ABA
1998).
9. See id. (citing Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 473
N.Y.S.2d 22, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
10. Id.
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11

irrevocable discretionary trust. With more than twenty years of
SNT development, consumer driven organizations, including the
ARC of America, and affiliated organizations in every state, the
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill and the National Autistic
Society, and its affiliates across the states, just to mention a few,
have been advising their members, numbering in the millions, to
12
utilize the SNT for estate planning purposes.
C. What the SNT Does
The SNT vehicle takes unilateral, discretionary powers given to
trustees for various situations and broadens the scope by specifically
expanding how the trustee supplements the needs of the trust
13
beneficiary. There are several variations of SNT distribution. In
one, the SNT details how the trustee, within his/her/its sole
discretion, administers the trust for the sole benefit of the
beneficiary, providing: health and medical provisions; social and
educational programs and services; recreation, vacations and even
trips abroad where appropriate; and institutional or group home
transition and placement, promoting community-based, leastrestrictive alternatives that would enhance the quality of life of the
14
trust beneficiary.
Additionally, the SNT is developed as irrevocable and
15
spendthrift in nature. The settlor develops language that bars any
use of trust funds for services already provided to the beneficiary
through federal and state programs. The SNT is exempt under
federal and state agency regulations that consider such trusts
16
appropriate as a matter of public policy.

11.
12.

Id. at 4.
See Harriet P. Prensky & Patricia Tobin, Using the Special Needs Trust, 4TH
ANNUAL NAELA SYMPOSIUM ON ELDER LAW § 15 (1992); M. Kent Olsen, Pooled
Income Trusts Following OBRA ‘93, NAELA ADVANCED INSTITUTE ON ELDER LAW IV §
17 (1994).
13. See generally Cynthia L. Barrett, Distribution Standard for the Special and
Supplemental Needs Trust, 14 J. OF NAT’ L ACAD. OF ELDER L. ATT’ YS (hereinafter
“NAELA Q UARTERLY”) 10, 10-13 (Summer 2001) (describing the six most
commonly used trust distribution standards and the likely impact on needs-based
public programs).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See State Medicaid Manual, Part 3–Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64
(1994).
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D. Special Needs Pooled Trust History
In 1950, parents of mentally retarded children organized the
National Association of Parents and Friends of Mentally Retarded
17
Children. As the children became adults and their parents aged,
the name changed (National Association of Retarded Citizens, aka
ARC of the United States) and the focus turned to finding those
who would care for the aging people with mental retardation after
their parents died or were no longer able to care for them in the
18
community.
In the 1970s, parents of children with severe chronic
disabilities, primarily mental retardation, worked with trust and
estates counsel to develop vehicles that would not only provide for
the transfer of funds for the benefit of their children with severe
disabilities, but, more importantly, mandate to the trustees detailed
instructions that addressed the quality of care and the quality of life
19
of the children to be served by the trustees.
State-based non-profit associations, organized as affiliates of
ARC, created parallel umbrella or pooled trusts that would receive
the assets of the parents in separate sub-accounts, and in return use
the corpus of the sub-trusts for the care-giving and quality of life
needs of the parents’ mentally retarded children. This is where the
concept and model for the d4C special needs pooled trust
(“SNPT”) came from when the legislation for prohibitions and
restrictions on trusts as part of Medicaid eligibility was hammered
20
out in congressional committee.
E. SNPT Politics
In the early nineties, Congress, concerned about escalating
Medicaid costs, made a concerted effort to stiffen regulations by

17. See WOODHULL HAY, Associations for Parents of Mental Retardates in
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (1952), available at
http://www.thearc.org/history/hay.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
18. Robert Segal, The National Association for Retarded Citizens, at
http://www.thearc.org/history/segal.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002).
19. See OLSEN, supra note 12, at 3-4. See also Renee Lovelace, The Dark Side of
Pooled Trusts, 14 J. OF NAT’ L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’ YS 6, 7 (2001); ARC, Aging Position
Statement #23, at http://www.thearc.org/posits/agingpost.html (last visited Aug.
23, 2002).
20. See A. Frank Johns, Interface with Elder Law: Elder Law’s Broader
Application of Estate Planning Reaches Beyond the Legal Profession--Is It Beyond
Lawyering as Well?, 23rd Annual Duke Estate Planning Conference (2001).
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which persons would become Medicaid-eligible.
As various
congressional committees wrote legislation focused on so-called
“Medicaid planning loop-holes,” the Medicaid Qualifying Trust
22
became a primary target for repeal. However, the consumer
groups identified above teamed with the AARP and other
organizations in the aging network, including the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, to negotiate the exemption of
23
several trusts that, if designed to allow for a “pay-over” (paying to
24
the nonprofit) or “pay-back” (reimbursement of the state for
Medicaid expenditures on behalf of the trust beneficiary) at the
end of the trust beneficiary’s life, would be exempt and not
25
counted under Medicaid eligibility requirements.
Lobbyists for the ARC and other organizations articulated that
tens of thousands of citizens already had such trusts in place
through hundreds of affiliated non-profit associations around the
26
country.
F. The Expanded Prohibitions Against Self-Settled Discretionary
Support or Special Needs Trusts
In 1985, Congress declared a statutory prohibition that targets
inter vivos self-settled trusts, including those for spouses, barring
access or attachment by state agencies providing public resources
27
to those trust creators and beneficiaries applying for Medicaid.
During this same period, the basic discretionary support trust was
expanded into supplemental or special needs trusts for disabled
persons, usually serving children of the grantors with mental
28
retardation or mental illness. As these trusts became more widely
recognized and used, critics decried the misuse of Medicaid, a
public benefits program for the poor, by children of the elderly

21. See generally Ira S. Wiesner, Asset Transfers, Trust Availabiity and Estate
Recovery Under OBRA ‘93: Statutory Analysis in Context, 3d NAELA Advanced Elder
Law Institute §§ 2-3 (1993); M. Kent Olsen, Trusts, Medicaid and OBRA ‘93, NAELA
Advanced Elder Law Institute III §§ 2-3 (1993).
22. See KRUSE, supra note 8, at 4, 11.
23. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6 n.2.
24. Id.
25. See infra note 33.
26. See supra note 21.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (2002).
28. See H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III, ET AL., DISABILITY AND THE FAMILY Chs.
14–16 (Brookes ed., 1989).
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29

G. OBRA ‘93 - Great Restrictions and Narrow Exceptions on SNTs
The prohibition against self-settled trusts created to gain
eligibility for Medicaid benefits was expanded in the early nineties
with passage by Congress of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993 (also known as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
30
1993 or OBRA ’93). The specific language declares:
(d) Treatment of trust amounts
(1) For purposes of determining an individual’s
eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan
under this subchapter, subject to paragraph (4), the
rules specified in paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust
established by such individual.
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual
shall be considered to have established a trust if assets of
the individual were used to form all or part of the
corpus of the trust and if any of the following
individuals established such trust other than by will:
(i) The individual.
(ii) The individual’s spouse.
(iii) A person, including a court or
administrative body, with legal authority to act in
place of or on behalf of the individual or the
individual’s spouse.
(iv) A person, including any court or
administrative body, acting at the direction or
upon the request of the individual or the
individual’s spouse.
(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which
includes assets of an individual (as determined under
29. The antagonists painted broad strokes and pithy sound bites, decrying socalled Medicaid Planners. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, “Poor” Middle Class Eats Up
Medicaid Program, THE GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Sept. 15, 1996 (“[Medicaid
planning] pops up when elderly people think about nursing homes. They may be
able to pay the bill, at least for the first year or two. But they’d prefer to leave the
money to their kids (or their kids would prefer it; they sometimes initiate this
game).”).
30. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. §§
13611, 13612 (1993) (amending § 1917(c)(1) of the Social Security Act)
(enacted).
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subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other person or
persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to
the portion of the trust attributable to the assets of the
individual.
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection
shall apply without regard to —
(i) the purposes for which a trust is
established,
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise
any discretion under the trust,
(iii) any restrictions on when or whether
distributions may be made from the trust, or
(iv) any restrictions on the use of
distributions from the trust.
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust - (i) the corpus of the trust shall be
considered resources available to the individual,
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the
benefit of the individual shall be considered
income of the individual, and
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall
be considered assets disposed of by the
individual for purposes of subsection (c) of this
section.
(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust —
(i) if there are any circumstances under
which payment from the trust could be made to
or for the benefit of the individual, the portion
of the corpus from which, or the income on the
corpus from which, payment to the individual
could be made shall be considered resources
available to the individual, and payments from
that portion of the corpus or income —
(I) to or for the benefit of the
individual, shall be considered income of the
individual, and
(II) for any other purpose, shall be
considered a transfer of assets by the
individual subject to subsection (c) of this
section; and
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(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or
any income on the corpus from which, no
payment could under any circumstances be
made to the individual shall be considered, as of
the date of establishment of the trust (or, if
later, the date on which payment to the
individual was foreclosed) to be assets disposed
by the individual for purposes of subsection (c)
of this section, and the value of the trust shall be
determined for purposes of such subsection by
including the amount of any payments made
31
from such portion of the trust after such date.
With the sweeping prohibition came a narrowly structured set
of three irrevocable “pay-back” or “pay-over” trusts against which
32
the prohibition would not apply.
“Pay-back” or “pay-over”
requirements would either repay Medicaid all payments made
under the Medicaid Program to the beneficiary of the trust at the
end of the beneficiary’s life, or pay over to the NPA the corpus of
the trust remaining at the end of the beneficiary’s life. The trusts
are statutorily described as follows:
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the
following trusts:
(A)A trust containing the assets of an individual
under age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section
1382c(a)(3) of this title) and which is established for
the benefit of such individual by a parent, grandparent,
legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State
will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon
the death of such individual up to an amount equal to
the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the
individual under a State plan under this subchapter.
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of
an individual if —
(i) the trust is composed only of pension,
Social Security, and other income to the individual
(and accumulated income in the trust),
(ii) the State will receive all amounts
remaining in the trust upon the death of such
individual up to an amount equal to the total
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2002).
32. Repayment would be all amounts remaining in the trust up to the total
amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary. See infra note 34.
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medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual
under a State plan under this subchapter, and
(iii) the State makes medical assistance
available to individuals described in section
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(v) of this title, but does not
make such assistance available to individuals for
nursing
facility
services
under
section
1396(a)(10)(C) of this title.
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual
who is disabled (as defined in section 1382(c)(a)(3) of
this title) that meets the following conditions:
(i) The trust is established and managed by a
nonprofit association.
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each
beneficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of
investment and management of funds, the trust
pools these accounts.
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely
for the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) by the parent,
grandparent, or legal guardian of such individuals,
by such individuals, or by a court.
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in
the beneficiary’s account upon the death of the
beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in
the account an amount equal to the total amount
of medical assistance paid on behalf of the
beneficiary under the State plan under this title.
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary)
under which the agency waives the application of this
subsection with respect to an individual if the individual
establishes that such application would work an undue
hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of
criteria established by the Secretary.
(6) The term “trust” includes any legal instrument or
device that is similar to a trust but includes an annuity
only to such
extent and in such manner as the Secretary
33
specified.
33.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002) [hereinafter d4A,
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III. OPERATION OF THE D4C SPECIAL NEEDS POOLED TRUST
The statutory criteria for the SNPT focuses on: (A) eligibility
of beneficiaries (especially those older than sixty-five); (B) a nonprofit association [“hereinafter NPA”] establishing and managing
the trust; (C) a separate or segregated account for each beneficiary;
(D) a pooled umbrella trust for investment and management of the
funds of all SNPTs held by the NPA; (E) accounts in the pooled
umbrella trust are maintained for the sole benefit of the persons
who are disabled; (F) creation of the trusts are by parents,
grandparents or legal guardians of such persons, by such persons
or by a court; and (G) remaining corpus of individual SNPTs left in
the trust is retained by the NPA, repaying to the Medicaid program
all other corpus not left in the trust up to the amount of medical
34
assistance paid by Medicaid for the beneficiary of the SNPT.
A. No Age Restriction Expressly Declared in a d4C SNPT
Since passage of OBRA ‘93, disabled, injured or elderly
persons younger than sixty-five have had the benefit of special
35
needs trusts under one particular section of the law. Those over
36
sixty-five were without such a benefit for many years. The Social
Security Administration took the position that: “such transfers are
subject to transfer penalties. Nothing in the Medicaid statute
permits us to reach a different conclusion. We believe that this
policy is clearly set forth in sections 3258.10 and 3259.7 of the State
37
Medicaid Manual.”
A review of HCFA 64 sections 3258.10 and 3259.7 shows the
38
circuitous argument HCFA used to reach its “belief.” Nowhere in
the “Medicaid” statute did Congress expressly declare that the d4C
39
trust was restricted to use by those under sixty-five. Congress was
explicit in its language, only restricting the d4A trust to use by

d4B and d4C], and implementing instructions, State Medicaid Manual, Part 3Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64 (1994) [hereinafter HCFA 64].
34. See d4C.
35. See d4A.
36. See KRUSE, supra note 8, at app. D, 241-42, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-24-023 (March
22, 1995) (regarding transfers into pooled trusts for beneficiaries over age sixtyfive).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 33.
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40

individuals under the age of sixty-five. However, HCFA wrote a
broader restriction in section 3258.10B, grafting the under-sixty-five
restriction on all OBRA ’93 exempt trusts, including the d4C
41
SNPT.
In the fall of 2001, HCFA responded to an inquiry by author
Clifton Kruse, Jr., declaring that people sixty-five or older have not
42
been limited from use of the d4C SNPT. The actual language of
the letter states:
With regard to your question about why certain trusts for
the disabled are subject to an age limit, the conference
report accompanying the enabling legislation (OBRA 92)
provided very little insight into why Congress elected to
write the legislation (including those portions that apply
an age limit to the trusts in question) as it did. In the
absence of any explanation from the Congress itself as to
why it imposed an age limit on those trusts, we hesitate to
speculate on Congress’ motivations in imposing such a
limit. As a technical point, however, we would note that
while an age limit does apply to two of the trusts you cite,
the statute does not impose an43age limit on the trust cited
at 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C).
With such an option available, lawyers serving older Americans
need to be aware of governmental benefit constraints, identifying
who their client is throughout the process; maintaining careful
attention to how the SNPT is developed, implemented and funded
through an appropriately qualified, organized and operated NPA;
and maintaining assurances that the elder persons for whom the
trusts are created actually receive benefits that enhance the quality
of their lives and extend their assets in ways that supplement their
standard of care for longer periods than had they not had the trusts
44
available.

40. Id.
41. See State Medicaid Manual, Part 3–Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64,
supra note 16, § 3258.10, Exceptions to Applications of Transfers of Assets Penalties, B.
“The assets were: . . .[t]ransferred to a trust (including a trust discussed in §
3259.7) established for the sole benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who
is disabled as defined under SSI.” Id.
42. A copy of the Letter Ruling is on file with the author. See also KRUSE, supra
note 8, at 328.
43. Id.
44. See John W. Staunton & Leo J. Govoni, Special Needs Trusts: Planning
Vehicles that Have Come of Age, 3 ELDER’ S ADVISOR, THE J. OF ELDER L. AND POSTRETIREMENT PLAN. 28, 30 (spring 2002).
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An NPA qualifies as trustee to administer a d4C special needs
pooled trust if it meets all necessary state corporate statutory and
45
Internal Revenue Code requirements.
B. NPA Establishing and Managing d4C SNPTs
1. Typical Statutory Requirements for NPAs
There are no extraordinary elements necessary to create and
operate the NPA that qualifies to manage d4C SNPTs. There must
be compliance with the charitable corporations or non-profit
associations statutes in the state where the NPA is a resident. In
many states, there need be only one incorporator, officer, and
board member. At times, the lawyer serves in all positions just to
create sufficient inertia to bring those operating and supporting
the NPA into a forum that will serve the lawyer’s clients and others
as well. There is usually no stock issued, and often there are no
members of an NPA created to manage d4C SNPTs.
Examples of NPAs providing care-giving and trust services for
SNPTs stretch across the country. One such NPA is Life Plan Trust
of North Carolina, an NPA started in 1990 by The Arc of North
Carolina and NAMI North Carolina (formerly the North Carolina
Alliance for the Mentally Ill). As explained on its website, Life Plan
Trust works with families of individuals with developmental
disabilities, mental illness and other disabilities to help develop
comprehensive plans for future care, serving as trustee for funds
designated for the benefit of disabled family members. Two other
sponsoring organizations of the NPA include the Autism Society of
46
North Carolina and United Cerebral Palsy.
Similar to other NPAs, Life Plan Trust of North Carolina has
an $800 enrollment fee and a $175 annual update fee with an
47
assurance that once a family enrolls the fees will not increase.
The fees are not to be confused with delivery of case management
services, currently billed at $60 per service hour. The enrollment
fee and annual update fees may be paid in monthly installments
48
over a period of months or years. The NPA makes it clear that
fees for client services are not tax deductible, but the contributions
45.
46.
47.
48.

See supra note 33.
See http://www.arcnc.org/lpt/faq.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
Id.
Id.
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solicited by the organizations are tax deductible because the NPA
has tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
49
Revenue Code (IRC).
Another example of an NPA serving d4C SNPTs is the selfincorporation of Tennessee Pooled Assets, Inc. by Timothy L.
50
Takacs, in the summer of 2000.
Takacs, a well-recognized
member of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys
(“NAELA”), made his work product available to other NAELA
members, hoping to assist advocates in other states to take the
initiative to organize pooled trusts, making SNPTs more readily
51
available to people with disabilities and older Americans.
Once the incorporation is filed and the charter is issued by the
secretary of state, the NPA often partners with a banking
institution, a trust company or a securities entity with a trust
component to bring asset investment and management
sophistication into the process, meeting the financial and fiduciary
responsibilities associated with d4C SNPTs.
The NPA created to be trustee of exempt d4C SNPTs must
52
have sufficient charitable purposes.
Usually, the focus is on
foundation status with additional components that allow for tax53
exempt charitable gifts.
2. Internal Revenue Code Requirements for Tax-Exempt Status–
IRC § 501(c)(3)
A tax-exempt NPA under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC must be
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the
purposes set out in the IRC, and none of the organization’s
earnings may be distributed to private shareholders. Also, the taxexempt NPA is barred from political action because a substantial
part of its activities attempts to influence legislation, and it is
completely barred from participating in any political campaigns or

49. Id.
50. The work product of Takacs, comprising nonprofit charter, nonprofit
organizing by incorporator, nonprofit bylaws and nonprofit organizing by the
board, are on file with the author.
51. Id.
52. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6. Lovelace actually describes the start-up
of the pooled trust as one primarily founded by those with compassion and
commitment to promote respectful quality of care and independent living options
for persons with disabilities of all ages. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
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54

activities for or against political candidates.
The organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are
55
commonly referred to as “charitable organizations.” The exempt
purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious,
educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering
national or international amateur sports competition, and the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. The term charitable is
used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the
poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening
the burdens of government; lessening of neighborhood tensions;
elimination of prejudice and discrimination; defense of human and
civil rights secured by law; and combating community deterioration
56
and juvenile delinquency.
Organization of an SNPT as tax-exempt must be exclusively for
a charitable purpose. An individual or partnership will not qualify;
only a corporate entity whose charter must limit its purposes to one
or more activities that are not in furtherance of one or more of
those purposes defined in the IRC will qualify. This requirement is
met by reference to declared purposes in section 501(c)(3) in the
corporation’s charter.
Additionally, the exempt entity must permanently dedicate its
assets to an exempt purpose, including that its assets will be
distributed for a section 501(c)(3) exempt purpose or to a federal,
state or local government for a public purpose. Assurance of
compliance may be shown by a provision in the corporate charter
insuring assets will be distributed for an exempt purpose in the
57
event of dissolution.
An organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for
one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in
activities which accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes

54. See generally IRS Publ’n 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization
(Rev. July 2001).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990).
57. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) and (5) (as amended in 1990). See
also, IRS Publ’n 557 (Rev. July 2001) (“Although reliance may be placed upon
state law to establish permanent dedication of assets for exempt purposes, an
organization’s application can be processed by the IRS more rapidly if its articles
of organization include a provision insuring permanent dedication of assets for
exempt purposes.”).
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specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is in
58
furtherance of non-exempt purposes. The organization must not
be organized or operated for any private purpose, and no net
earnings shall be of benefit or interest to private entities or
individuals. If such a private benefit transaction passes to a person
having substantial influence over the organization, then a possible
excise tax may be imposed on the person and any managers
59
agreeing to the transaction.
3. Internal Revenue Code Requirements for Section 509
Often the NPAs are organized under the tax-exempt
foundation requirements of section 509 of the IRC. Generally,
‘‘private foundation’’ means a domestic or foreign organization
60
described in section 501(c)(3), with other exceptions. NPAs
functioning on a foundation basis must not receive more than onethird support in each taxable year from any combination of gifts,
61
grants, contributions, or membership fees. Gross receipts of the
NPA may also come from admissions, sales of merchandise,
performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity
which is not an unrelated trade or business, in any taxable year to
the extent such receipts exceed the greater of $5,000 or one
percent of the organization’s support in such taxable year, from
persons other than disqualified persons with respect to the
organization, from governmental units as described, or from
62
organizations as described. The NPA must continue singular
63
operation of those functions that first gained tax-exempt status.
While the NPA must be non-profit, OBRA ‘93 does not require
such a narrow focus as to be created only by those entities that have
members who will benefit from the SNPTs that would be
64
administered by the NPA. Lovelace writes that organizations
creating the NPAs have voluntary boards and voluntary attorneys
that use fundraising skills on the built in market of their own
members. She explains that this is often necessary because SNPT
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
See I.R.C. § 509 (2002).
I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(i) (2002).
I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2002).
I.R.C. §§ 509(b), 507 (2002).
See supra note 34, and accompanying text.
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C. Separate or Segregated Account for Each Beneficiary
For the trust to be exempt, the corpus of each individual’s
trust account must be separate and segregated, categorically
benefiting only the persons with disability, including those sixty-five
66
and older who are medically needy. Banks or trust companies
providing services for the trust funds under management have the
necessary programs to maintain each account. The bank or trust
company will also make necessary distributions, and apply interest
67
accumulation with monthly or quarterly statements.
D. A Pooled Umbrella Trust for Investment and Management of the
Funds of All SNPTs Held by the NPA
As detailed above, pooled trusts are special needs trusts
comprised of assets of elder citizens and people with disabilities
and consolidated under an umbrella trust of an NPA, serving as
68
trustee and responsible for the care of the trust beneficiaries. It
has been noted that the term “pooled income trust” has been used
69
occasionally in describing the d4C SNPT. Olsen mentions that it
would be beneficial to use a trust form, meeting the requirements
of the pooled income fund described in IRC § 642(c)(5), similar to
the sample published by the IRS in 1988 to deal with pooled
income trusts because there have been many requests for rulings
70
dealing with the qualification of such trusts.
Since pooled trusts are exempt under Medicaid, each
beneficiary of the pooled trust is usually an eligible Medicaid
71
recipient, if all other eligibility criteria are met. The assets of the
special needs trusts are pooled under an umbrella trust for
management and cost efficiency, with accumulating interest
72
credited to each individual’s sub-account. The supplemental or
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 8. See also Barrett, supra note 13.
68. See supra note 33.
69. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 3-4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Not only is it a matter of cost efficiency, it is probably the only way that
commercial banking or trust entities may be enticed to provide the investment
and asset management services that many NPAs are incapable of providing. A
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special needs of each individual are funded with the assets ascribed
categorically to the individual during the individual’s lifetime, or
until the individual’s funds are exhausted. If no court process is
involved, then a joinder agreement establishes the sub-trust that
frames the individual’s care plan, providing the NPA the basis by
which distributions through a structured annuity might be
73
determined, or monthly care-giving expenses might be developed.
An NPA providing care and advocacy for the beneficiaries of
the trusts must be the trustee of the pooled trusts in order for the
trusts to be exempt as d4C SNPTs. An incentive to NPAs comes
when, rather than repaying Medicaid for all of the expenses that
the client accumulated in long-term care, the NPAs retain the
assets remaining in the trust in order to serve other Medicaid
74
recipients of similar need.
The importance of the concept deserves restatement. If
Medicaid recipients have no one to care for them, and no families
available to advocate their interests, then the NPA, as trustee of the
pooled trust for the benefit of the Medicaid recipients, would
supplement the Medicaid needs of the beneficiaries of the pooled
trust in order to sustain the quality of their lives. Any assets
remaining in the pooled trust beyond the lives of the beneficiaries
would be retained by the NPA to be used for its purposes and
mission in serving similarly situated vulnerable elder citizens or
75
persons with disabilities.
E. Accounts in the Pooled Umbrella Trust are Maintained for the Sole
Benefit of the Persons Who Are Disabled
Every sub-trust of the NPA, carried under the umbrella trust
must individually declare that its corpus is for the sole benefit of
76
the primary beneficiary of the sub-trust. As important as the
declaration of sole benefit is in the sub-trust document, the
administration and distribution requirements imposed on the NPA
must at all times evidence the use of the principal and interest
accumulation of the sub-trust for the sole benefit of the primary
majority of the SNPTs created have modest amounts of principal incapable of
meeting the minimum amount necessary to be accepted by commercial banks and
trust companies.
73. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 6.
74. Id. See supra note 33.
75. Id.
76. Id. See supra note 33.
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77

beneficiary.
The impact of whether or not the sole benefit of the primary
beneficiary extends beyond the language of the trust documents
may be realized during the on-going administration of the trust, at
78
the time that the trust terminates, or both. If during a periodic
review of trust receipts and disbursements, the reviewing agency
finds that those other than the primary beneficiary benefited from
distribution out of the trust, then the primary beneficiary may be
declared ineligible with a sanction of some period of time.
Additionally, when the trust terminates at the end of the
beneficiary’s life, or when the corpus of the trust is depleted, the
state agency may declare that since the trust had operated in
violation of the sole benefit rule, the “pay-back” provision would be
79
invoked, denying the “pay-over” to the NPA as a penalty against it.
F. Creation of SNPTs by Parents, Grandparents or Legal Guardians
of Such Persons, by Such Persons or by a Court
The d4C SNPT is the only OBRA ‘93 exempt trust that may be
self-settled or self-created. The individual, if competent, may create
the trust him- or herself. However, a majority of the SNPT
beneficiaries probably does not have sufficient capacity to create
the trust. If a beneficiary is not competent, but her or his money is
to be used to fund the SNPT, then the requisite durable power of
attorney or guardianship must be in place to effectuate the SNPT’s
creation.
If the SNPT is created from funds derived from personal injury
litigation, then there may be several complicated layers of
procedural process added that may need more than just elder law
or estate and trust expertise. To quickly end personal injury
litigation, the funds may be offered in a lump sum, circumventing
the time needed to develop a structured settlement. When this
occurs, the lawyer involved must be experienced and capable of
placing the funds in a Qualified Settlement Fund (“QSF”) as a safe
80
haven until the structure is set and the annuity purchased.
77. Id.
78. See Mary T. Schmitt Smith, After the Wedding–Administration of Special Needs
Trusts: Tuning Up the Trustees, NAELA Advanced Elder Law Institute VII, § 19
(1997); Roger M. Bernstein, Special Needs Trusts: Administration and Compliance, 14
J. OF NAT’ L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’ YS 13 (Summer 2001).
79. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6.
80. See IRC § 130(c). A qualified assignment may be made of any liability to
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Having the funds initially placed in the QSF meets certain
81
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
When the elder law or estate and trust attorney is sought to
develop an SNPT as a receptacle for the settlement or judgment of
personal injury litigation, the first ethical question is no different
than the ethical question raised at the beginning of any clientlawyer relationship--who is the client? The answer and its ethical
82
discussion are found later in the article.
G. Remaining Corpus of Individual SNPTs Left in the Trust is
Retained by the Non-profit Association, Repaying to the Medicaid
Program All Other Corpus Not Left in the Trust Up to the Amount
of Medical Assistance Paid by Medicaid for the Beneficiary of the
SNPT
The underlying reason for the way this part of the law is
written is grounded in the public policy focus of the d4C SNPT
exemption. One political agenda item in Congress at the time
83
OBRA ‘93 was enacted was the down-sizing of “big government”
84
thereby reducing taxes and the so-called “Welfare State.”
Changing the pay-back to Medicaid so that it became a pay-over to
an NPA in essence created a revenue source for private NPAs to
provide additional care-giving and advocacy for those otherwise
dependant on federal and state funds and local government case
85
management.

make periodic payments as damages awarded pursuant to a judgment or
settlement, or as compensation under any workmen’s compensation act, on
account of a physical personal injury or sickness. In order to be a “qualified
assignment,” however, an assignment must meet requirements as detailed in the
section. Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 93-34, 299, announcing that a “designated
settlement fund” or a “qualified settlement fund” would be treated as a “party to
the suit or agreement” within the meaning of IRC § 130(c)(1), and after August
10, 1993, an assignment made by a designated or qualified settlement fund is a
qualified assignment if the certain requirements are met. Id.
81. Effective for claims filed after August 5, 1997, liability to make periodic
payments as compensation under any workmen’s compensation act, or other
personal injury claim may also be validly assigned. IRC § 130(c).
82. See infra section IV.
83. See supra note 33.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS ARTICLE
A. The General Framework of Legal Ethics
Generally, lawyers are mindful of the rules of professional
86
conduct as they relate to client engagement. Within the elder law
and estate-planning context, lawyers need to be aware of the
prospective client and the newly enacted ABA model rule that
87
addresses the prospective client. Beyond the concern for conflict
of interest and confidentiality as relates to a prospective client,
attention should also be given to the diminished capacity of the
88
prospective client. This has greater importance in the context of
this article because trust beneficiaries must be disabled to be
89
eligible for Medicaid. Significant numbers of those who are
90
disabled SNPT beneficiaries are mentally incompetent as well.
Other recent changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are worth noting, as this article examines more
complicated ethical considerations that elder law and estate and
trust lawyers would confront in considering the benefit of the
SNPTs as an option for clients.
B. Recent Changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
that Impact Lawyers Developing Special Needs Pooled Trusts when
Serving Injured, Disabled and Elderly Clients
Over the last several years, the ABA and state bars have
confronted the changing status of the legal profession by generally
responding to ethical and practice changes, many of which will
specifically impact elder law and estate and trust attorneys.
Through the Center for Professional Responsibility, the ABA
developed and interpreted standards and scholarly resources in
86. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are used throughout this
article for the ethics analysis. Adoption of the Model Rules in virtually every state,
whether in whole or in part is the broadest disciplinary mandate that is uniform
across the country. See Jeffery N. Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism and Malpractice
Issues in Estate Planning and Administration, 2 (ALI-ABA 2002).
87. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2002).
88. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT, R. 1.14 and accompanying
comments. See also the revisions to M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 and
accompanying comments 29-32.
89. See Social Security Act § 1614(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3). See also supra
note 33.
90. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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legal ethics, professional regulation, professionalism and client
91
protection mechanisms.
Since 1997, the ABA went further,
organizing two commissions, one to look internally at the
92
profession’s ethics beyond the year 2000, and the other to look
externally at how law practices will be organized into the next
93
century.
The ABA Ethics 2000 (E2K) Commission worked at a feverish
pace from its beginning in August 1997, to February of this year,
finishing its task for presentation of its recommendations at the
annual meeting of the ABA House of Delegates in August of 2001,
and at its midwinter meeting in February 2002. The thirteenmember Commission, reflecting the ABA’s diversity with judges,
law professors, government lawyers, corporate counsel, civil and
91. With substantial overlap and interaction, the Center describes its
departments as follows: the Ethics Department is the place for study, development
and implementation of model legal and judicial ethics standards; the
Professionalism Department provides counsel to various ABA committees as well
as support in efforts to improve the professionalism and competence of lawyers
and judges; the Professional Regulation Department provides legal support and
policy guidance for various ABA committees as well as responds to requests for
information on case law, statistics and procedural standards; and The Client
Protection Department serves the concerns and best interests of the client
population through programs that prevent or redress harm done in the practice
of
law
or
the
rendering
of
legal
services.
See
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/home.html.
92. In support of its assertion that it has maintained a great leadership role in
ethics and professionalism of the legal profession, the ABA cites the adoption of its
ethical standards by virtually every jurisdiction, implicitly acknowledging that it is a
recognized leader and the appropriate forum for discussing, drafting and
adopting
rules
governing
lawyer
conduct.
See
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html.
93. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (hereinafter ABA
MDP Commission) was created in August, 1998, to face the unprecedented
challenges of revolutionary advances in technology and information sharing, of
the globalization of the capital and financial services markets, and of more
expansive government regulation of commercial and private activities. The ABA
MDP Commission’s members included a cross-section of the legal profession
including distinguished practitioners, judges, and academicians. It worked
believing that there was a degree of urgency with the emergence of consulting
firms that had been aggressively soliciting clients, offering services remarkably
similar to those traditionally offered by law firms, such as advice on mergers and
acquisitions, estate planning, human resources, and litigation support systems. In
1999, the recommendations for MDP were tabled. In 2000, the New York Session
of the ABA House of Delegates overwhelmingly defeated the recommendations
for MDP. The ABA Journal reported that on July 11, 2000, the delegates “crushed
mixed practices in which lawyers and other professionals would work under the
same roof, sharing fees and firm ownership.” See John Gibeaut, “It’s a Done Deal,”
House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92 (September 2000).
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criminal practitioners and one non-lawyer, was charged with: 1)
conducting a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical
and professionalism precepts of the legal profession; 2) examining
and evaluating the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the rules governing professional conduct in the state and federal
jurisdictions; 3) conducting original research, surveys and hearings;
94
and 4) formulating recommendations for action.
The ABA E2K Commission met and fulfilled its charge when
during the 2001 meeting of the American Bar Association House of
Delegates in Chicago; the House voted on the recommended
additions and revisions of the Model Rules from the Preamble
through Rule 1.10 and approved the Commission’s
95
recommendations with several exceptions.
The passage of a new definition of informed consent in Model
Rule 1.0(e), revisions of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6, and
conflict of interest in Model Rule 1.7, brings clarity to elder law
96
attorneys and estate and trust lawyers. The new definition of
informed consent in new Model Rule 1.1 will assist elder law
attorneys and estate and trust lawyers to conclude whether or not
elderly clients of diminished capacity still have sufficient informed
consent to engage an attorney for representation and the delivery
97
of legal services.
The clarity of the amended definition of conflict of interest in
Model Rule 1.7, removes the confusion between direct adversity
conflicts and material limitation, assisting elder law attorneys and
estate and trust lawyers in determining which situations pose “a
significant risk” such that the representation will be limited by the
98
lawyer’s interests and duty to others. This will be applied in this
article when the lawyer is determining if there is a significant risk
that compromises loyalty and duty when representing the NPA of
an SNPT and the primary beneficiary as well.
94. See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html.
95. Rule 1.5: approved an amendment to delete the requirement of a writing
in Rule 1.5(b). Rule 1.6: approved an amendment to delete proposed Rule
1.6(b)(2). In light of the House’s action in deleting 1.6(b)(2), the Commission
withdrew its proposed 1.6(b)(3). The House also approved an amendment from
the Commission to modify Rule 1.6, Comment [13]. Rule 1.10: approved an
amendment to delete proposed Rule 1.10(c). See
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html.
96. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_home.html.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Initially, the ethical analysis in this context is not difficult. The
elder law attorney or estate and trust lawyer knows to pose the
question, “Who is the client?” to those who have made the initial
99
appointment. The answer should always come from them. The
client is often the elderly person seeking legal engagement for
developing ways by which asset preservation and quality of life
issues might be addressed for future needs. However, this initial
contact becomes more complicated when there are members of the
family other than the spouse in the conference, when multiple
individuals are identified for involvement beyond the initial
consult, or when the older person who is seeking legal services has
100
diminished capacity.
While inter-generational or family unit
101
representation is not within the scope of this article, what is
within its scope is multiple and secondary or derivative client
102
representation, touching on the Doctrine of Privity as well. The
article’s focus within that scope is the stress that presses against the
ethical boundaries of lawyering as the lawyer begins the clientlawyer relationship, developing the SNPT for the injured or
99. See generally Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Ethical Issues in Representing
Older Clients, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (1994) (discussing potential conflicts of
interest in the representation of joint clients, such as husbands and wives). See infra
note 117.
100. See Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to
representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1080
(1994); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices–What’s an
Attorney to Do? Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101,
1153 (1994); Robert B. Fleming & Rebecca C. Morgan, Lawyers’ Ethical Dilemmas:
A “Normal” Relationship When Representing Demented Clients and Their Families, 35
GEORGIA L. REV. 735 (2001).
101. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Approaches to Conflicts in
Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1258 n.17, citing Patricia M. Batt,
Note, The Family Unit As Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting
Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1992); see also Thomas L. Shaffer,
The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX . L. REV. 963 (1987).
102. See Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Ethical Obligations of Counsel In Representing Clients
Petitioning to be Appointed as Guardians of Others or of Their Estates, or Both, 8 J. OF
NAT’ L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’ YS 13 (1995). See also Fickett v. Superior Court, 558
P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (Fickett, considered seminal, is cited in most writings
and decisions in this area of law); In re Guardianship of Styer, 536 P.2d 717 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1975) The facts of the guardian’s misconduct on which the Fickett
decision was predicated are found in this trial case where a judgment surcharge
was affirmed against the guardian for $378,789.62. Id. For an analysis, see A. Frank
Johns, Fickett’s Thicket: The Lawyer’s Expanding Fiduciary and Ethical Boundaries When
Serving Older Americans of Moderate Wealth (hereinafter Fickett’s Thicket), 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 445 (1997); Pennell, supra note 86, at 56; Bruce S. Ross,
Conservatorship Litigation and Lawyer Liability: A Guide Through the Maze, 31 STETSON
L. REV. 757, 776-80 (2002).
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disabled elderly client, involving the NPA trustee and counseling
the NPA on administration of the trust and distribution of the
income and principal of the trust, this being the more active
103
component much later in the lawyer’s engagement.
For elder law, estate planning, family law, tax, and general
practice attorneys, representation in the twenty-first century will go
beyond identification of the single client, often including joint and
multiple representation, involving intergenerational and
104
multigenerational family layers. Before representation may be
established, there must be confirmation that the prospective client
has sufficient competence or capacity to enter into the client-lawyer
105
engagement. Once the identification of the client is confirmed,
the broader spectrum of elder law engagement may address quality
106
of life and quality of services to the elders in the family.
Concomitant with medical and health care needs, the engagement
may also delve into consideration of long term care insurance,
estate and divestment planning for tax or governmental benefits
consideration, asset exemptions and transfers and in-home options
often leading to transition into assisted living or nursing home
environments, or even transition of residency, domicile and state
107
citizenship.

103. Notice how in this one sentence the lawyer begins by representing the
beneficiary and ends by representing the NPA.
104. See generally A. Frank Johns, Multiple and Intergenerational Relationships, in
THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 7 (2001 Symposium Issue, American Bar Association).
105. See Fleming & Morgan, supra note 100, at 750-51.
106. See William E. Adams & Rebecca C. Morgan, Representing the Client Who Is
Older in the Law Office and in the Courtroom, 2 ELDER L. J. 1, 2 (1994). The National
Elder Law Foundation (NELF), the only national American Bar Associationlicensed entity certifying attorneys in elder law, identifies fourteen areas in which
examination is required for lawyers to gain NELF board certification in elder law:
(1) HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE PLANNING; (2) PRE-MORTEM LEGAL
PLANNING, including TRUSTS; (3) POST-MORTEM LEGAL PLANNING, Probate
and Estate Administration; (4) FIDUCIARY REPRESENTATION; (5) LEGAL
CAPACITY COUNSELING, GUARDIANSHIP and CONSERVATORSHIP; (6)
PUBLIC BENEFITS ADVICE–from Medicare to Medicaid to Special Assistance; (7)
INSURANCE MATTERS–from health, to GAP, to life, to long term care; (8)
RESIDENT RIGHTS ADVOCACY; (9) HOUSING COUNSELING; (10)
EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT COUNSELING; (11) INCOME, ESTATE,
AND GIFT TAX COUNSELING; (12) TORT CLAIMS AGAINST NURSING
HOMES; (13) LITIGATION IN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTIONS; and (14) AGE OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING.
107. Id.
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C. Proceeding in the Client-Lawyer Engagement within the Context of
Developing the SNPT
This section briefly frames the general application of legal
ethics at the inception of any client-lawyer engagement, then moves
through several categories of individuals and entities with whom
elder law attorneys and estate and trust lawyers might negotiate the
SNPT client-lawyer engagement.
1. General Application of the Ethics Rules at the Inception of Any
Engagement
At the inception of being engaged, all attorneys generally must
deal with client competence, communication, confidences and
loyalty. Elder law attorneys also must assess the client’s competence
to hire counsel or to have sufficient informed consent to enter into
a contractual relationship that delivers future legal services. Many
elder law attorneys have included as an element of the scope of
prospective representation a reasonable screen, assessment or
108
calculation of client capacity within the consult.
Acting with
sensitivity, reasonable legal competence and diligence, elder law
attorneys assess client capacity while honoring client confidences
109
and protecting property.
a. Initial Client Contact
110

Whether denominated lawyer-client, or client-lawyer, the
legal profession has proceeded at a snail’s pace when it comes to
including client capacity in discussions about the initial client
111
conference. Professor Rebecca Morgan, an elder law authority,
wrote about the representation of older clients, “[a]lthough the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility . . . recognize the nonlitigation roles of attorneys more explicitly . . . the Model Rules still
fail to provide adequate practical guidance to the elder law
108. See Fleming and Morgan, supra note 100, at 750-51.
109. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 19.
110. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 2.1 (explaining that the four duties [competence, communication,
confidentiality and loyalty] of the core principles of the law of lawyering run to the
client, and noting that The Kutak Commission symbolized the primacy of client
interests by reversing the common “lawyer-client” reference). See also ACTEC
Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (3d. ed. ACTEC
Foundation 1999) [hereinafter ACTEC Commentaries] .
111. See generally Johns, supra note 104.
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112

practitioner.” Little is found outside the elder law construct to
guide lawyers through the rigors of confirming sufficient client
competence or capacity at initial contact, allowing consultation, or
determining what, if any, future legal services may be contracted.
The recent revisions to the Model Rules introduced new Model
Rule 1.18 relating to the prospective client, which, beginning with a
concise definition, addresses confidentiality and examines possible
material adverse interests between the prospective client and the
113
lawyer.
Currently there is no connection between Rule 1.18,
defining the prospective client, and Model Rule 1.14, client with
diminished capacity, which addresses the ongoing client-lawyer
114
relationship when the client has declining mental abilities.
There needs to be a connection between the two rules, providing
112. See Adams & Morgan, supra note 106, at 13 (citing, among others, Ronald
C. Link, et al., Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate
Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1987)).
113. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT, R. 1.18 (2002)
DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT
(a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a
client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective
client.
(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has
had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal
information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would
permit with respect to information of a former client.
(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with
interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same
or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information
from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that
person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer
is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in
a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or
continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in
paragraph (d).
(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined
in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:
(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given
informed consent in writing, or
(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable
measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than
was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the
prospective client; and

114.

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the
fee therefrom; and
(ii) written notice is propmptly given to the prospective client.
See generally Johns, supra note 104.
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guidance to lawyers dealing with prospective clients with
115
diminished capacity.
b. Formation of Client-Lawyer Relationship
The legal profession first views the relationship of the client
and lawyer based on the manifestation of the person’s intent. The
relationship arises when a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s
116
intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person. While
intent is founded on capacity, general legal texts address the clientlawyer relationship based on the client having fully informed
117
consent, which is based on what the lawyer discloses to the client
concerning the benefits and advantages of the proposed
representation and conflicts of interest. There is general legal
comment about legally incompetent clients who require
representation for which they are personally incapable of giving
118
consent.
However, the writings identify those who are already
incompetent and are either represented by a guardian or, if
119
minors, represented by their parents.
c. Current and Future Consideration of the Prospective Client
Currently, few general writings of the legal profession mention
the attorney’s need to assess the elderly client’s competence to hire
counsel or to assess capacity to function and make legal choices
120
with informed consent.
Since the new Model Rule 1.18
regarding the prospective client only looks at confidentiality and
115. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 14 (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS].
117. See Model Rule 1.0(e). New definition of informed consent applicable to
all Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
(e) “Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.
118. Id.
119. See RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 116 (referencing
case law addressing legally incompetent clients based on minority).
120. Cf. Erica Wood & Audrey Straight, Effective Counseling of Older Adults (ABA
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly of the ABA and Legal Counsel for
the Elderly, Inc., 1995). Age myths that stereotype older people as senile,
confused, disabled, and the like, promote the dangers of “ageism.” While some
degree of short-term memory loss is part of normal aging, a significant or
complete failing in mental abilities is not a normal part of the aging process.
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conflicts in terms of the lawyer’s duty to the prospective client,
there remains a lack of guidance regarding the prospective client’s
121
diminished capacity.
Consider Model Rules 1.2 and 1.16,
bracketing the beginning and the ending of the client-lawyer
relationship. These rules are more concerned with the lawyer’s
role and whether what the lawyer is being asked to do is moral or
ethical, than whether the client has capacity to consummate the
engagement.
d. The Lawyer’s Duties to Prospective Clients
Even if not engaged, the lawyer may have duties to prospective
clients that include protecting confidential information, property
and providing reasonable care. This is where emphasis on the
client’s capacity deserves attention. Attention to client capacity is
not currently examined in the legal profession until the client122
attorney relationship has been established and is ongoing. Texts
referenced above provide information and basic primers on
structuring initial contact, intake and the first consultation in an
elder law practice. The client-lawyer relationship begins with the
initial call, proceeds to the initial appointment and continues
through the first conference.
2. The Lawyer, the SNPT and the Initial Client Engagement
The need for an SNPT surfaces in various ways in the practice
of elder law and estate and trust lawyers. A disabled or elderly
person may need specialized legal assistance to negotiate and
develop the SNPT with a NPA or consumer group; plaintiff or
defense counsel may seek specialized legal assistance to fund a trust
with the settlement or judgment derived from personal injury
litigation for a permanently disabled plaintiff; banking or trust
counsel may refer their client for specialized legal assistance in the
development of a supplemental or special needs trust for the
client’s banking customer; an NPA or consumer disability advocacy
group may seek specialized legal assistance for a disabled member
or to assist in the creation of the umbrella trust or separate sub121.
122.

See supra note 110, and accompanying text.
See supra note 88, Model Rule 1.14; see also, RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 117, § 24 A Client With Diminished Capacity, at 269 through 2-75, § 31 Termination of A Lawyer’s Authority, 2-103-2-110; see ACTEC
Commentaries, supra note 110, at 131.
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trusts; a guardian or attorney in fact may seek specialized legal
assistance to negotiate and develop the SNPT with a NPA or
consumer group.
a. Ethics Analysis
As stated earlier in this article, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct of the ABA (“Model Rules”) are often used for ethics
123
assessments.
Beyond the core requirements of loyalty and
diligence, Pennell suggests the ethical issues confronting elder law
124
and estate and trust lawyers fall under several general categories.
In this article, several of the above described areas of client-lawyer
engagement are analyzed, focusing on conflicts of interest, failure
to exercise independent judgment and violation of client
confidences.
(1) The Disabled Person as Client
The d4C SNPT requires the individual beneficiary of the trust
125
to be disabled.
However, the individual may be mentally
competent, while at the same time meeting the statutory definition
126
of disabled. This is where a tension between the plaintiff and the
family may surface, leading to possible material conflicts with the
plaintiff’s attorney and the SNT specialist (“Specialist”) involved.
(a) The Mentally Competent Disabled Client
When the disabled client is competent, the attorney should
make it a habit of practice to meet separately and privately with the
disabled beneficiary to directly and frankly discuss the limitations
on the use of judgment or settlement funds, and the distributions
127
that will be available from the SNPT. It is critical that the lawyer
provide the client an explanation of the lack of wealth transfer at
123. See Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism and Malpractice Issues in Estate Planning
and Administration, supra note 86, at 2.
124. Id. at 4. Conflicts of interest, failure to exercise independent judgment,
violation of client confidences, incompetent or inadequate representation,
excessive fees, special estate administration concerns, a general sense of duty to
the system and misconduct involving solicitation and advertising. Id.
125. See supra note 33.
126. See generally revised M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT, R. 1.14, supra note
88 and accompanying text (changing the emphasis from focusing on a client
under disability to a client with diminished capacity).
127. See supra note 66, and accompanying text.
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the end of the beneficiary’s life under the SNPT, as well as the
involvement of the NPA in carrying the authority and control over
128
the client’s case management and distributions from the SNPT.
Many family members of the SNPT beneficiary assume that
they have a right to funds of the personal injury judgment or
settlement. Purchases of houses, vehicles and other personal
property items in the names of family members become points of
tension and contention between the family members and the
lawyers even before the SNPT is funded. Those family members
involved in hiring the SNT specialist often believe that Specialist is
acting in their interests, beyond the interest of the SNPT
beneficiary, supposedly his or her client. However, if the SNT
specialist raises an objection, asserting opposition against selfserving actions of family members, (s)he may find that the family
members have acquired the assistance of new counsel. First and
foremost, the lawyer must counter the tensions and
misunderstandings of the people involved with the identification of
the client. When the identity of the client is confirmed at the
inception of the engagement, then the lawyer’s protection and
focus on the SNT beneficiary is more easily accepted by the other
family members, especially when it has been memorialized in an
129
engagement contract.
Often, spouses and other family members are identified as
plaintiffs in the litigation. At the beginning of the client-lawyer
relationship, the attorney must clarify if they are also clients of the
130
SNT specialist in a multiple representation. It should be made
128. Id. If under the age of sixty-five, the client may choose to have the trust
created under d4A, without the NPA and its receipt of the remaining assets at the
end of the beneficiary’s life. Under d4A, after Medicaid payback, the remaining
corpus of the trust may be distributed to identified contingent beneficiaries, or
distributed as dictated by the will of the primary beneficiary, or distributed to the
deceased beneficiary’s estate.
129. A proposed revision of the ABA Model Rules included a recommendation
that lawyers have written engagement contracts. However, in the August 2001
meeting of the House of Delegates, it declined to require lawyers to put all fee
agreements with their clients in writing. Under existing rules, only contingent fees
must be committed to writing. See Margaret Colgate Love, Summary Of House of
Delegates Action On Ethics 2000 Commission Report,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-summary_2002.html (last visited August 15,
2002). See also Summary of House of Delegates action on Report 401 during ABA Midyear
Meeting in Philadelphia (February 2002) http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k202report_summ.html.
130. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Parties in
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clear that funds received through individual family members’
causes of action are the only funds available for the individual use
of family members and not the funds settling the SNT beneficiary’s
personal injury litigation. Otherwise, a core element of the
eligibility requirements for the SNPT, namely that the SNPT solely
131
benefits the primary beneficiary, is factually conflicted.
(b) The Mentally Incompetent Disabled Client
There are countless facts, situations and relationships that may
impact differently, often negatively, on the decision to create an
132
SNPT. That is why the SNT specialist should acquire sufficient
facts about the case from the very beginning to confirm the
133
necessity of the services. If a guardian is already in place, then
the situation may entail discussion with both the guardian’s
attorney and the ward’s attorney in order to resolve engagement
134
for legal services. However, the ward’s attorney may insist that
the plaintiff’s attorney engage the SNT specialist. This is possible
and does not conflict with any ethics rules as long as the plaintiff’s
attorney understands that the fees of the SNT specialist may be his
or her responsibility, thus requiring that the plaintiff’s attorney pay
for such services out of the contingency fee percentage of the
135
suit. Consider the following case study of Harrison:

Non-Litigation Context, at 107-111 (4th ed. 1999).
131. See supra note 33.
132. Once the engagement and legal relationship have been confirmed, the
disability trust Specialist should acquire the pleadings of the case, including the
complaint, answer, dispositive motions, if any, summaries of any discovery,
especially any documents, answers to interrogatories, and summaries of transcripts
of deposition of any medical or health care professionals. This is necessary in
order for the disability trust Specialist to have a full understanding of the status of
the case, and how it presents a case involving a qualified disability.
133. Just as important, there needs to be documentation of any ancillary
proceedings, including adjudication of incapacity and the appointment of a
guardian and all approvals and denials of eligibility of federal and state benefits.
134. Often the lawyer for the guardian is the only lawyer involved in the
guardianship and may represent the interests of both the guardian and the ward.
Elder law and estate and trust attorneys must be inquisitive about such
representation, raising questions of the guardian’s attorney’s ability to represent
the ward as well.
135. See A. Frank Johns, The Application of Recommended Changes to ABA Model
Rule 1.14 When Initiating Guardianship Intervention for Clients, 14 J. OF NAT’ L ACAD.
ELDER L. ATT’ YS 16 (2001).
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(c) Case Study–Harrison and Personal Injury
Harrison was 67, two years into retirement and heading to
meet his wife for a long vacation. He and his wife were
working class people of modest means. What little they
had saved they were about to spend on that one cruise of
their lifetimes. However, as life would have it, on the
same road, a truck driver fell asleep, crossed the center
line and hit Harrison’s car at 80 miles per hour,
demolishing it.
The accident permanently disabled Harrison, even after
sixteen hours of reconstructive surgery and seventeen
weeks in intensive care and rehabilitation. Between
Medicare and Medicaid, $266,000.00 was paid for the
hospital, surgeries, medications and rehabilitation.
Harrison would require intermediate nursing care for
many years and attendant, in-home care for the rest of his
life. He was also cognitively impaired to the extent that
formal guardianship may be required to represent his
interests in his personal injury litigation, to assist him in
his daily life and to manage his affairs.
Lawyer may be representing Harrison in the personal
injury litigation as well as representing Harrison’s wife
through the guardianship process, ending in her
appointment as guardian for Harrison. Lawyer does not
have the legal experience to develop, fund and
implement a special needs trust. Lawyer decides that the
help of SNT Specialist is needed. He calls SNT Specialist.
In the case study, no guardian is yet in place, however one is
anticipated. When contacted by the Harrison family lawyer, SNT
Specialist should inquire about whether there will be an
appointment of a guardian ad litem for Harrison under Civil
136
137
Procedure Rule 17(c) if suit is filed. The guardian ad litem, or
136. Under most state rules of civil procedure, and under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(c), provision is made for appointment of a next friend or guardian
ad litem:
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons.
Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian,
committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An
infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed
representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such
other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or
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the next friend, is often the spouse. Harrison’s wife could be the
guardian ad litem, and should also be considered for appointment
as plenary guardian or guardian of the person by the probate court.
Depending upon state law, a guardian may be necessary to assert
138
claims for Harrison in the personal injury litigation.
Payment for SNT Specialist will often come from the proceeds
of the settlement or award. It must be made clear to the disability
trust specialist that if this is so, then fees may not be paid until after
the legal services have been rendered and proceeds of the award or
settlement are disbursed by the court.
(2) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.7–General Rule
The complications of Conflict of Interest Doctrine were
recognized by the ABA E2K Commission, believing lawyers needed
139
additional guidance. The adopted Model Rule 1.7 revisions are
designed to clarify the basic doctrine and to address a number of
recurring situations. The reorganization of Rule 1.7 Comments
provides an introduction (Comments 1-3), a general road-map to
conflicts analysis (Comments 4-13), and finally an elaboration on
different types of conflicts, especially non-litigation and estate and
trust considerations (Comments 27-33 Special Considerations in
140
Common Representations).
incompetent person.
FED . R. CIV. P. 17(c).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Culton v. Culton, 386 S.E.2d 592, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
139. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
140. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27-33 (2002) (showing
the proposed revisions that were passed are restated here because of their import:
[27] Conflict For example, conflict questions may also arise in estate
planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to
prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife,
and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may
arise be present,. In estate administration the identity of the client may
be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view,
the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or
trust, including its beneficiaries. The In order to comply with conflict
of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer’s relationship
to the parties involved.
[12] [28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the
circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic
to each other, but common representation is permissible where the
clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some
difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish
or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually
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advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in
which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial
reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an
interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate.
The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing
the parties’ mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to
obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring
additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other
relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of
them.
Special Considerations in Common Representation
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same
matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation
fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the
result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination.
Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all
of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations,
the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly
impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common
representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations
between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the
lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented
clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is
unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the
relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the
possibility that the clients’ interests can be adequately served by
common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are
whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a
continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or
terminating a relationship between the parties.
[30] A particularly important factor in determining the
appropriateness of common representation is the effect on clientlawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between
commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it
must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the
privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients
should be so advised.
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common
representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client
attempts to keep something in confidence between the lawyer and that
client, which is not to be disclosed to the other client. This is so
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each
client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the
representation that might affect that client’s interests and the right to
expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client’s benefit.
See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common
representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s
informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared
and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that
some matter material to the representation should be kept from the
other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to
proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after
being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information
confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that
failure to disclose one client’s trade secrets to another client will not
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The confusing aspects of Model Rule 1.7, when and how to
apply a material limitation when direct adversity is not present,
were the target of revising Model Rule 1.7 by the ABA E2K
141
Commission. The Reporter’s Explanation of Changes to Model
Rule 1.7 describes how it should make it easier for lawyers to apply
“material limitation,” “consentability” and “informed consent” to
the assessment of “who the client is” when initiating client-lawyer
relationships. It also explains the expansion of the comments to
Model Rule 1.7 to provide better guidance to lawyers:
Unlike prior paragraph (b), in which a conflict exists if
the representation “may be” materially limited by the
lawyer’s interests or duties to others, revised paragraph
(a)(2) limits conflicts to situations in which there is “a
significant risk” that the representation will be so limited.
This change is not substantive, reflecting instead how
prior paragraph (b)
is presently interpreted by courts and
142
ethics committees.
Unlike the prior rule, the revised Rule 1.7 contains a single
standard of consentability and informed consent, applicable both
to direct adversity and material limitation conflicts. This standard
is set forth in a separate paragraph, both to reflect the separate
steps required in analyzing conflicts (i.e., first identify potentially
impermissible conflicts, then determine if the representation is
permissible with the client’s consent) and to highlight the fact that
143
not all conflicts are consentable.
In the case study, Lawyer faces the common dilemma of
adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the
clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the
informed consent of both clients.
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients,
the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer’s role is not that of
partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that
the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for
decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any
limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a
result of the common representation should be fully explained to the
clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common
representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and
the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former
client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in
Rule 1.16.).
141. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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conflict of interest as framed in Model Rules 1.7 and 1.18. In
identifying any potentially-impermissible conflict of Lawyer relating
to Harrison and his wife, Lawyer must determine if the
representation is permissible with Harrison and his wife’s consent.
Is there a reasonable belief that Lawyer would be able to represent
the wife, as guardian, and Harrison as plaintiff, through the wife as
guardian, while not adversely affecting the relationship that he
would have with either Harrison or his wife to the extent that a
conflict exists? In this analysis, the operative words may be
“concurrent conflict.” If Lawyer is first asked to assist Harrison’s
wife through the guardianship process, and then subsequently
represents Harrison’s wife as guardian in the judicial process to
gain approval of the SNPT, the conflict would not be concurrent,
as SNT Specialist at all times represents Harrison’s wife as
145
petitioner and then subsequently as guardian. However, the way
by which elder law and estate and trust lawyers are initially involved
in personal injury cases such as this one is often not so carefully
handled. A probable engagement will be similar to the one
described in the case study--Lawyer, representing Harrison,
subsequently finds a need to represent his wife or a family member
through the guardianship process. If these are the facts of the
engagement, then Model Rule 1.7(b) will further require Lawyer or
SNT Specialist to determine whether to provide competent and
diligent representation to each client affected by common
146
representation.
This could mean that the SNT Specialist must
consult with Harrison and his wife as potentially conflicted clients,
giving them notice of the possible conflict so that they might make
informed decisions about the engagement. If they choose to be
147
jointly represented their decisions must be in writing.
The twist here is that Harrison is identified as one who may
have such diminished capacity that he cannot make an informed
148
decision. Therefore, one of SNT Specialist’s clients is one who

144. See supra note 96. See also M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.18, supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
145. Id.; see also ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110 at 152, 175.
146. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2002); ACTEC
Commentaries, supra note 110 at 154.
147. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002). See also ACTEC,
Engagement Letters: A Guide for Practitioners 9, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Engagement
Letters].
148. Engagement Letters, supra note 147, at 60.
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149

may be incapable of giving consent.
Additionally, if SNT
Specialist is representing Harrison and his wife, then current
practice would probably bar the specialist from representing
150
Harrison’s wife as petitioner in the guardianship process. The
situation presents itself as “something that’s just not right” where
the wife of Harrison as guardian waives her lawyer’s conflict of
interest relating to her and gives written consent, at the same time
she waives the lawyer’s conflict of interest relating to Harrison and
151
gives written consent for him as well.
If Lawyer and SNT Specialist agree that Harrison is SNT
152
Specialist’s client, then concern for possible conflicts diminish.
149. See RESTATEMENT 3D--LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 116 at § 202(1).
However, as noted in ABA Form Ethics Opinion 96-404, at n. 3, considering
comment (1) to Rule 1.14 lawyers are reminded that “a client lacking legal
confidence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach
conclusions about matters effecting the client’s own well-being. Furthermore, to
an increasing extent, the law recognized intermediate degrees of competence.”
Id. Query whether Harrison has sufficient cognitive function would still allow him
to understand what the disability Specialist is disclosing about conflict and sign a
written consent that was informed?
150. See Johns, supra note 135; ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 96-404 (1996)
(discussining provisions of Client Under Disability). A portion of the opinion is
pertinent to this analysis and directive:
A lawyer who is petitioning for a guardianship for his incompetent
client may wish to support the appointment of a particular person or
entity as guardian. Provided the lawyer has made a reasonable
assessment of the person or entity’s fitness and qualifications, there is
no reason why the lawyer should not support, or even recommend,
such an appointment. Recommending or supporting the appointment
of a particular guardian is to be distinguished from representing that
person or entity’s interest, and does not raise issues under Rule 1.7(a)
or (b), because the lawyer has but one client in the matter, the putative
ward.
Once a person has been adjudged incompetent and a guardian has
been appointed to act on his behalf, the lawyer is free to represent the
guardian. However, prior to that time, any expectation the lawyer may
have of future employment by the person he is recommending for
appointment as guardian must be brought to the attention of the
appointing court. This is because the lawyer’s duty of candor to the
tribunal, coupled with his special responsibilities to the disabled client,
require that he make full disclosure of his potential pecuniary interest
in having a particular person appointed as guardian. See Rules 3.3 and
1.7(b). The lawyer should also disclose any knowledge or belief he may
have concerning the client’s preference for a different guardian. The
substantive law of the forum may require such disclosure.
Id.
151. RESTATEMENT 3D- THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, at § 202 cmt. c (ii).
152. Under the privity doctrine, plaintiff has no contractual relationship with
SNT Specialist. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also infra note 204
and accompanying text and analysis.
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153

However, potential conflicts remain.
SNT Specialist must
consider how Harrison’s wife and how she (as a non-client) would
feel about issues raised regarding Harrison’s personal injury special
needs trust. She might want to direct SNT Specialist into possible
conflicts with SNT Specialist’s representation of Harrison. This
should be an obvious danger signal, enough to put the lawyer on
154
notice and act accordingly.
(3) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the
following variation:
Before SNT Specialist was brought into the case, the
insurance claims adjuster told Lawyer that in other cases a
trust was constructed to keep the injured person on
Medicaid and still have the remaining settlement money
available in a reserve fund. The adjuster had the
insurance company’s defense attorney contact Lawyer,
explaining that the settlement could be greatly expanded
with a Court ordered structured settlement distributing
the proceeds to an SNPT. The adjustor explained to
153. While states that have adopted Model Rule 1.14, or something similar,
provide clear direction to lawyers when finding it necessary to consider filing for
guardianship for a client, ethics opinions for states without the rule are also
instructive. See North Carolina RPC 157 (before North Carolina adopted Model
Rule 1.14). A lawyer who represented a person who the lawyer believed to be
incompetent was permitted to seek to have the person declared incompetent but
could not disclose any information that the lawyer had obtained in his course of
representation that would give rise to the attorney’s belief that the client was
incompetent. The rationale was that there was no exception to the disclosure of
confidential information permitted under the rules. Id.
154. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 130, at 108,
(citing In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1992)); Russell G. Pearce, Forward to
Symposium on “Should the Family Be Represented as an Entity?”: Reexamining the Family
Values of Legal Ethics, 22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 1, 2 n.5, 6 and 33 (1998) “[I]n the
context of bar organization deliberations, arguments for a communitarian
construction of legal ethics codes has been offered. . . . Apparently as a result of
lobbying by bar groups, the American Law Institute modified the Restatement of
Law Governing Lawyers to permit lawyers greater flexibility in limiting their
obligations to individual family members in joint representation . . . .” Id.; Linda
S. Whitton, Durable Powers As a Hedge against Guardianship: Should the Attorney-at-law
Accept Appointment As Attorney-in-fact?, 2 ELDER L.J. 39, 39 (1994). See also Naomi
Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Representation,
22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 106 (1998); Teresa Stanton Collett, Love Among the Ruins:
The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married Couples, 22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 106
(1998); Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for
Elder Clients: A Context, Role and Law Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994).
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Lawyer that if Lawyer agreed to a structured settlement
that was the product of the insurance defense company,
then the insurance defense company would pay a
percentage of the commission to Lawyer as a finder’s fee.
The adjustor assured Lawyer that this was done with many
other lawyers and that documentation of the
appropriateness and adequacy of the annuity and of the
strength of the underlying insurance company would be
disclosed for the Court’s review.

(a) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.8–Current
Clients: Specific Rules
In the case study, Lawyer is knowingly acquiring a pecuniary
155
interest adverse to Harrison. Plaintiffs’ lawyers in personal injury
cases may be conflicted by the defense offering to settle with the
specific requirement that the defense insurance company’s
products be used for structuring the settlement, otherwise no
settlement. At a minimum, under Model Rule 1.8(a), everything
offered to Lawyer must be fairly and fully disclosed in writing to
Harrison and his wife, if she is the guardian, and to SNT
156
Specialist.
Being involved with the acquisition of an insurance product in
the form of an annuity, and receiving a fee or commission when
doing so requires Lawyer to exercise greater responsibilities as
specifically framed in Model Rule 5.7 relating to ancillary related
157
services and products. If the state in which Lawyer practices has
158
Model Rule 5.7, or a similar rule, regarding ancillary and related
services, then the concern will be whether Lawyer is receiving a fee
for the product that is being sold for the settlement structure when
159
nothing in the facts shows compliance with the rule.
155. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2002).
156. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002).
157. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002). See Alex Moschella,
Model Rule 5.7–The Boundaries of the Profession, 14 J. OF NAT’ L ACAD. ELDER L. ATTY’ S
3 (2001).
158. Id. Since 1994, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota and
Pennsylvania (with slight modification) have adopted Model Rule 5.7. Florida is in
the process of considering Model Rule 5.7.
159. See supra note 157. In a broader sense, the actions of Lawyer meet the
“presumptive, albeit rebuttable” design of the current rule in that the sale of the
annuity is considered “law-related” in that it is being provided by Lawyer, and the
rules of professional conduct apply. Id.
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Elder law and estate and trust lawyers are pushed to expand
the scope of their specialties in law, defining how the specialties are
160
properly delivered to clients.
To cover the broader scope of
lawyering, many legal specialists have hired non-lawyer
professionals in their practices, while others have offered lawrelated and non-law related services and products to their clients in
161
a one-stop-shop modality. Many elder law and estate and trust
lawyers are now providing various forms of insurance products to
clients as a complement to asset preservation and estate planning
162
163
legal services. The recent revision to Model Rule 5.7, has made
it broader, clarifying ability of lawyers to deliver law-related services
distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services in certain
164
circumstances. The Reporter explains that the revision prevents
a literal, strict application of paragraph (a)(1) so that there is never
a time when law-related services would be distinct from the
provision of legal services if directly provided by a lawyer or law
165
firm, rather than by a separate entity.

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Moschella, supra note 157, at 3.
163. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002). The full text of the rule
is as follows:
RULE 5.7: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED
SERVICES
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph
(b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by a separate an entity controlled by the
lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the lawrelated services knows that the services of the separate entity are not
legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer
relationship do not exist.
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as
unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.
164. See Ethics 2000–February 2002 Report: Model Rule 5.7, Reporter’s
Explanation of Changes, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule57rem.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2002).
165. Id.
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(b) Ancillary and Related Legal Products and
Services–Model Rule 5.7
The Harrison case study calls for a generalized description of
what ancillary services are and how the rule impacts on such
services and products. The National Academy of Elder Law
Attorneys (NAELA), under the leadership of past president
Rebecca C. Morgan, professor of law at the Stetson University
College of Law, examined ancillary and related services in a task
166
force from which a NAELA White Paper was published in 1999.
The foundation of information on which the recommendations are
based is a cross-section of many state cases, statutes or codes and
167
the rules of state bar organizations across the country.
The
services, relationships and products that may fit any practice area
are broadly defined in two groups: (1) law related; and (2) non-law
168
related.
When is it appropriate to provide law-related ancillary services
and products? The answer to this question is found in the 1994
findings of the ABA Committee on Ancillary Business Services,
appointed to review ancillary business activities by lawyers in
166. See Alex L. Moschella, Chair, Interim Report on Multidisciplinary Practice and
Ancillary Services, 11 NAT’ L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’ S SYMPOSIUM, at Tab 6, Exhibit 3
(May 2000) (Plenary session addressing the question of multi-disciplinary practice:
point-counterpoint).
167. Id.
168. Id. Examples of law-related services, include, but certainly are not limited
to, the following: (1) providing internet technology and access to law firms for
legal research; (2) offering processes and forms for lawyers to integrate into their
practices that help clients through federal and state fair hearings; (3) promoting a
lawyer’s trustee and guardianship expertise to be used by other firms for
appointment to such positions; and (4) offering financial and tax analysis to
lawyers for their clients. Id.
Examples of non law related services and products include, but certainly are not
limited to: (1) selling all forms of insurance products, especially long term care
insurance; (2) offering many forms of psychological assessments, geriatric nursing
and care management services; (3) delivering a wide array of finance, investment
and money management products and services; (4) publishing advisory bulletins
and reporter services that keep lawyers and consumers informed about trends in
elder law; and (5) mechanical and technical support and consultation to elder law
attorneys who develop, design, and market to consumers, especially on the
Internet with links, lists, home pages and web visibility. Id. All of the above
references may actually fit in the broader scope of services and products
considered law-related under the ABA’s Model Rule 5.7. The Comment to Rule
5.7 includes title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real
estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work,
psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical, or environmental
counseling. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 9 (2002).
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preparation for the ABA House of Delegates’ consideration of the
169
proposed Model Rule 5.7. The answer may also be found in each
state’s legal ethics rules, decisions, statutes and case law. NAELA’s
Task Force found that many of the ABA Committee on Ancillary
Business Services’ findings and recommendations were pertinent to
170
any analysis of ancillary and related products and services. Two
are applicable here:
1. Whenever a lawyer provides law-related services, “there
exists the potential for ethical problems,” and that
“[p]rincipal among these is the possibility that the
person for whom the law-related services are
performed fails to understand that the services may not
carry with them the protections normally afforded as
part of the client-lawyer relationship.”
2. When law-related services are provided by a lawyer
“under circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients,” the
lawyer in providing the law-related services must
adhere to the requirements of the Rules of Professional
171
Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7 (a) (1). . .”
At the time of the findings, the ABA Committee on Ancillary
Business Services found no reported disciplinary infractions or
malpractice claims resulting from the delivery of law-related
172
services by lawyers through separate entities.
(c) Applying the Case Study to Model Rule 5.7
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the
following variation:
SNT Specialist found it beneficial years ago to obtain an
insurance license, authorizing her to sell structured
annuities while working as an elder law attorney. She has
continually maintained her insurance license, selling
insurance and annuities as a complement to her SNT
practice.
As with other cases, SNT Specialist went in with the
insurance defense company’s lawyer to purchase the
defense insurance company’s structured annuity for
169.
170.
171.
172.

M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002).
See Moschella, supra note 157, at 32-33.
Id.
Id. at 31-34.
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Harrison. SNT Specialist would receive a significant
commission if she sold Harrison and his wife the annuity.
SNT Specialist went to great lengths to disclose orally and
in writing what she was doing for Harrison and his wife,
explaining that she was properly licensed and that the
license was active and current.
SNT Specialist also explained orally and in writing that
she would receive a commission or fee on the sale of the
structured annuity policy that would fund Harrison’s
SNPT. She also provided Harrison and his wife with
information regarding her license and a toll-free
telephone number they could call to inquire of the state’s
Department of Insurance consumer protection
ombudsman regarding the propriety of the arrangement.
SNT Specialist went further, offering them information
from the state’s legal ethics commission that confirmed
that such an arrangement was within the ethical
boundaries of the legal profession and in compliance with
the state’s ethics rule 5.7.
Assuming the SNT specialist was within the ethical rules of the
173
state bar where she practices,
she has met the primary
requirements to sell the product to Harrison and his wife by being
licensed, providing disclosure, and carefully explaining to the
clients where they may seek more information about the propriety
173. In states where there is no equivalent to Rule 5.7, state bar organizations
are carefully examining the future. The North Carolina State Bar has not
amended its rules to include Model Rule 5.7, Ancillary and Related Services and
Products. However, the North Carolina Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP”) Task
Force noted in its report and recommendations (September 2000) that RPC 238
already permits certain ancillary services by attorneys. The MDP Task Force
believes the core values of the legal profession may be maintained when law firms
offer such ancillary services. The MDP Task Force further suggested disclosure to
the public of such arrangements and that such disclosure should be embodied in a
new Rule of Professional Conduct, such as proposed Rule 5.7. See also North
Carolina 2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 9, available at http://www.ncbar.com/eth-op
(last visited Aug. 14, 2002) (addressing whether an attorney who was also a CPA
could offer accounting services from within the law firm. By answering the
question affirmatively, the North Carolina State Bar led some lawyers to assume
that attorney/CPAs with proper securities and insurance licenses may provide
clients with financial planning services and products and receive a fee or
commission for selling such services or products since many accounting firms offer
securities as part of their services. That jump seems to have been premature). See
also North Carolina 2001 Formal Ethics Opinion 9, available at
http://ncbar.com/eth-op (last visited Aug 14, 2002) (concluding that Rule 1.8(b)
prevents an attorney from taking advantage of financial information received from
a client during the legal relationship).
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of her selling ancillary products for a commission. It is important
to note that SNT Specialist’s law firm conforms its delivery of
ancillary services and products to meet the requirements of Model
Rule 5.7, and those identified in Model 3 of the first ABA MDP
174
Commission, by assuring that all clients of the ancillary insurance
service are given clear notice that the services are law related and
provided in conjunction with the delivery of legal services, and if
otherwise provided would not be unauthorized practice of law.
Regardless of the conclusion that the practice of the SNT
Specialist conforms to Rule 5.7, the lawyer and the insurance
defense company agent may be acting outside the mandate of
175
other ethics rules.
SNT Specialist, by taking a commission from the insurance
defense company annutiy, engages in an impropriety rising to a
level that is improper based on the facts as presented in the
variation. It is not apparent that SNT Specialist made clear to
Harrison and his wife that she is literally in with the opposition,
176
possibly clouding her independent judgment. Regardless of the
current ethics rule in SNT Specialist’s state, state variations and
iterations within the ABA clearly show that there is significant
conflict over what rule should apply. If SNT Specialist intends to
continue providing such a related service, then she must remain
cautious and vigilant in tracking future rule developments and how
177
changes may impact her ancillary work.
(4) Violation of Client Confidences
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the
following variation:
While devastated by the accident and severely disabled,
Harrison lost no cognitive function. In the year that
followed, it was never certain that Harrison would live.
The strain on his wife and children was enormous, literally
driving all of them away, burned out by the stress and
continual demands Harrison made on all of them.
174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
175. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2002) (explaining whether a
fee is fair and appropriate), R. 1.8 (2002) (explaining disclosure requirements), R.
5.4 (explaining the professional independence of a lawyer).
176. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 28 n.38 (citing Illinois State Bar Ass’n
Advisory Op. No. 99-06, 1999, where an attorney received a fee from a trust
company to which the attorney referred business).
177. Id. at 29.
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Harrison was adamant that Lawyer was to do nothing and
say nothing to his wife and children, contending that they
only saw him as their gravy train. The conflict was so
severe that Lawyer almost sent wife and children to
another personal injury lawyer for their claims and causes
of action, if any, resulting from the accident.
During that year, Lawyer at all times only dealt with
Harrison, his client, on his claims. But then the
defendant truck company offered its liability insurance
policy limits of three million dollars for Harrison’s claims
only. This came after the initial demand letter and a life
plan was followed by numerous letters and a mediation
conference had been held before suit was filed. While
three million dollars seemed large, one third would go to
Lawyer, and one third would go to Medicare and
Medicaid to pay back lien claims of almost one third.
Over Lawyer’s advice otherwise, Harrison made the
decision to accept the offer and get the lawyering over
with.
Lawyer goes to Harrison’s wife and children, trying to get
them to persuade Harrison otherwise. Harrison’s wife
and children agreed with Lawyer, and made it clear to
Lawyer that they intended to go after the truck company
for additional damages beyond the policy limits, especially
since it impacted their own claims negatively.
The clarity of Rule 1.6 on confidentiality has been
178
strengthened with recent model rule revisions. Facts of the case
study clearly show Lawyer violating the rule. No matter how much
Lawyer believed that Harrison’s decision was wrong, it was not
enough to allow Lawyer to talk to persons with whom Harrison
specifically directed him not to talk, and certainly not to divulge
confidential information.
Although Lawyer’s ethical break seems clear, it never seems
clear when lawyers are in the middle of such situations. The
pressure on lawyers to hold on to clients and to maximize their
potential fees is significant. However, regardless of the want of
lawyers to make more, violations bring necessary sanctions.
Safeguarding confidentiality is one of the most important
179
protections that lawyers give to their clients.

178.
179.

M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
Id.
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While Rule 1.6 is easily read and usually followed, the
difficulty comes most often when the lawyer has a relationship with
family members of the client being served. Tensions regarding
confidentiality between spouses and their lawyer in a multiple
representation have been examined in countless symposia, books,
181
and articles.
This particular situation is uncommon. However,
similar situations commonly occur, often arising in the context of
conventional
estate
planning
and
intergenerational
communications. So important is this ethical protection that it even
182
extends beyond death.
If the above case study is too simplistic and an obvious
violation of Rule 1.6, then consider a twist in the facts where lawyer
has hired SNT Specialist and SNT Specialist does not represent
Harrison, but represents Lawyer. SNT Specialist’s engagement is to
180. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 29.
181. See ABA Annotated Model Rules (4th ed. 1999), at 108 (citing In re
Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1 (Mo 1992)); Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers As a
Hedge against Guardianship: Should the Attorney-at-law Accept Appointment As
Attorney-in-fact?, 2 ELDER L. J. 39 (1994). See also (i) Russell G. Pearce, Forward,
Symposium: Should the Family Be Represented as an Entity?: Reexamining the
Family Values of Legal Ethics, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5, 6 and n.33
(1998)(“in the context of bar organization deliberations, arguments for a
communitarian construction of legal ethics codes has been offered . . . .Apparently
as a result of lobbying by bar groups, the American Law Institute modified the
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers to permit lawyers greater flexibility in
limiting their obligations to individual family members in joint
representation….”); Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The
Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 106 (1998); Teresa
Stanton Collett, Love Among the Ruins: The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married
Couples, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (1998); and Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson
Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for Elder Clients: A Context, Role and Law
Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994).
182. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 34-35. See also, North Carolina RPC 206
where the personal representative of a decedent sought to have decedent’s
attorney disclose confidential information to the personal representative. RPC
206 indicates that the duty of confidentiality continues after death of a decedent
and a lawyer may only reveal such confidential information of a deceased client if
disclosure is permitted by an exception to the duty of confidentiality. See also
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding the attorney-client
privilege continues after the death of a client). In RPC 206, it was assumed that
the client impliedly authorized the release of confidential information to the
person designated as personal representative so the estate might be properly and
thoroughly administered. The RPC concludes that “unless the disclosure of
confidential information to the personal representative . . .would be clearly
contrary to the goals of the original representation or would be contrary to
express instructions given by the client to his lawyer prior to the client’s death, the
lawyer may reveal a client’s confidential information to the personal
representative.”
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provide to Lawyer the special needs trust, structured so that an
NPA is the pooled trustee. Wife and children are on the SNPT
advisory committee, advising and instructing trustee on trust
distributions. They also are contingent beneficiaries of the SNPT
183
beyond Harrison’s life. In this situation, SNT Specialist divulges
information that lawyer shares with her about the settlement and
about lawyer’s objection to Harrison settling on the policy limits.
Does the result change when one is a step or two removed from the
direct confidential relationship? The answer is no. Confidentiality
has been violated and it does not matter from what source or by
184
whom. Lawyer had a duty to make clear to SNT Specialist that
Harrison had qualified communications, baring communcations
between Lawyer and his wife and children. This extended to SNT
Specialist even if SNT Specialist was not told by Lawyer. SNT
Specialist should have more carefully discussed with Lawyer how
SNT Specialist would accomplish her task without divulging
confidential information, and with whom she could share
Harrison’s confidences.
185

b. The Participants in Personal Injury Litigation

When sought to be involved in personal injury litigation, elder
law and estate and trust lawyers answer the question “Who is my
client?” correctly as long as they adhere to ethics rules invoking
186
loyalty, duty and, confidences. The lawyer may agree to be the
plaintiff’s lawyer, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s lawyer, the defendant’s
lawyer, the defendant’s lawyer’s lawyer or even the defense
insurance company’s lawyer.
Once the client or clients who have the client-lawyer
relationship are identified in a personal injury case, the intervening
elder law or estate and trust lawyer must resolve whether he or she
183. The more restrictive application of d4c would require the total remaining
corpus to remain in the NPA, or pay back Medicaid and then allow disbursement
to contingent beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C); supra note 33.
184. Id.
185. The author previously published portions of this part of the article in A.
Frank Johns, Preserving Assets with Supplemental Needs Trusts, TRIAL, November 1998,
at 90.
186. Cf. Pennell, supra note 86, at 20 (citing the late Fred Corneel, who
suggests a reality check that asks two questions: “(1) who does the attorney think
is the client, and (2) who do the clients think is their attorney? If the role the
attorney thinks (s)he is playing and the role the clients think he is playing differ, it
is a pretty safe guess that a conflict exists”).
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will be an attorney of record in the case. This often requires
appearing at hearings where distribution of the damage award or
187
settlement is considered. In many cases, the SNT Specialist is not
an attorney of record in the case; she or he only provides
consultation and documents to the client or clients while not
188
actually participating in the judicial process.
189
In the variations above relating to confidences, when the
estate and trust practitioner or elder law attorney is engaged, there
should be extensive documentation of the many conflicts and
difficulties going on between Harrison and his family. Once
engaged, SNT Specialist should reply with his or her own written
documentation of what he or she believes the hooks and difficulties
are within the client matter and have the client confirm the
accuracy of what SNT Specialist has documented. If the client is
the lawyer, then understanding what is being asked for should be
clear. If not, written request for confirmation of the client-lawyer
relationship is a must. However, when the client is the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s family, or others who do not understand the rules of
legal ethics, then an even more lengthy explanation and
confirmation of position should be documented before any work
begins.
c. The Bank or Trust Company as a Client
Problematic to the focus of this article, special needs pooled
trusts, is the choice of a trustee, because the trustee by definition
must be an NPA. No known banks or trust companies have within
their corporate structures an NPA that serves as trustee of SNPTs.
187. This could be customized on a case by case basis. However, the other
attorneys involved will look to the Specialist to appear and field all questions
raised by the court relating to the motions and pleadings before it.
188. It is this author’s opinion that consulting without court appearance is not
the best practice, and may not be the best advocacy for the disabled plaintiff. This
is so in part because the best practice (and in some states the rule) is to give notice
of the hearing on the motion for a court ordered trust to the government
providers involved, or to be involved in covering costs of medical and health care
needs and services of the disabled plaintiff benefiting from the resources diverted
to the special needs trust. Attorneys representing government providers have not
only appeared on a regular basis at hearings as attorneys of record, but have
generated significant (sometimes credible) opposition to the disabled plaintiff’s
pursuit of the court’s order authorizing the creation of the trust, and the
distribution of the award or settlement funds into it.
189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002); supra text
accompanying note 34.
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However, this author has had recent contact with boutique trust
companies whose focus is partnering with those involved in
personal injury litigation and structure settlement consultants
negotiating the annuities that are subsequently a significant
component of the SNTs or SNPTs that are the end result. The
trust companies are also looking to partner with NPAs in the asset
management of lump settlements, and the acquisition of structured
annuities to be held in SNPTs. This has presented situations where
the bank or trust company has been integrally involved in
negotiating the engagement of the SNPT legal Specialist, creating a
strong inference that the bank or trust company is the client.
These situations are similar to banks and trust companies working
with elder law attorneys and estate and trust lawyers to promote the
use of the bank or trust company’s revocable trust forms so that the
customers and clients will usually choose the bank or trust company
190
as trustee.
In some situations, the analogy is closer to arrangements that
surface in marketing living trusts. In an article for the Fordham
191
Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients,
Professor Pennell addressed problems involving various kinds of
fiduciaries, raising the question of the lawyer’s response when the
fiduciary, or administrator, engages in illegal or improper acts or
conduct, particularly when it impacts a vulnerable elderly
192
beneficiary. Pennell chronicled the confusion in authority that
existed at the time while providing alternatives that may permit
193
lawyers to make disclosures to beneficiaries. Since publication of
the Fordham Ethics Conference On the Elderly in 1994, the
revision to Model Rule 1.7 and its comments has attempted to
address situations when there is a need to not only confirm in
writing who the client is to the client, but to those who are not the
194
client as well.
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the
following variation:
Lawyer had on several occasions in the past used
CeteBank to provide lines of credit to fund the larger
190. See Pennell, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
191. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the
Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Model Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 27-33 (2002); supra text
accompanying note 140.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss1/4

50

Johns: Legal Ethics Applied to Initial Client-Lawyer Engagements in whic
JOHNS FORMATTED .DOC

2002]

9/6/2002 10:06 PM

ETHICS AND SPECIAL NEEDS POOLED TRUSTS

97

personal injury cases in his practice. Harrison’s case was
no different. CeteBank also provided Lawyer personally
with securities and insurance services and products.
When the time came for Lawyer to consider an SNPT for
Harrison, he mentioned it to his CeteBank banker. It just
so happened that the bank was a huge multi-national
institutional conglomerate. Banker contacted his services
and products division in Cete, Germany, finding out that
not only did CeteBank have an SNPT, but it also had
CareGivers, Inc., an NPA care-giving company on contract
to CeteBank. CareGivers, Inc., would provide both the
non-profit vehicle required by law, and the case
management needed for Harrison. CeteBank convinced
Lawyer that its structured annuity, nonprofit association,
and SNPT documents were “tried and true,” having been
approved countless times in courts across the country.
CeteBank explained to Lawyer that he should hire a
Specialist to be his counsel, to provide the actual SNPT
document and to confirm the propriety of CareGivers,
Inc., as the NPA. Lawyer hired SNT Specialist to develop
the SNPT and advise about CareGivers, Inc. The written
engagement contract made clear that SNT Specialist was
only Lawyer’s lawyer.
SNT Specialist approved
CareGivers, Inc., and sent Lawyer her proposed SNPT
document. Lawyer sent it to CeteBank counsel in New
York. The SNPT document was returned to SNT
Specialist and with edit expressly confirming that
CeteBank would be the asset management and investment
advisor of CareGivers, Inc., but would also use CeteBank
subsidiaries to provide products and services for which it
would pay fees and commissions as in its normal banking
arrangements with other customers. None of the
additional fees and commissions would be considered a
part of the fees that CeteBank or CareGivers, Inc. would
be paid for trustee and banking services.
SNT Specialist made clear to its client, Lawyer, that
Lawyer could be exposed to future criticism for what was
added to the SNPT and that Lawyer had a duty to make
clear to his client what was in the SNPT and how it would
impact on Harrison.
Lawyer countered that SNT
Specialist was his lawyer and nothing was to be
communicated to Harrison by SNT Specialist.
After the SNPT was in place and fully funded, Lawyer took
responsibility for the SNPT estate and fiduciary
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administration. Nothing was in writing, except for
Lawyer’s form letter sent to Harrison declaring the clientlawyer relationship in the personal injury case closed.
(1) Conflict of Interest – Model Rule 1.7 – General Rule
When working with SNPTs, applying the adversity component
of Rule 1.7 is no less confusing than before the revisions. This is
especially true since the House of Delegates rejected the E2K
Commission’s recommendation to require engagement letters in
all client-lawyer relationships. It instead required a written contract
only in those situations where the material limitation and adversity
195
are significant. In this case study variation, there are numerous
points where clarity of relationship, as far as the client-lawyer
representation is concerned, should have been confirmed in
196
writing. Certainly, SNT Specialist should have had a document
that mandated the limitations imposed by Lawyer. When there is
no oral or express written declaration of engagement that confirms
who the client is, lawyers are at risk that what they have entered
197
into does not comport with the conflicts rule. Additionally, they
198
will find no real support in existing authority, which is

195. See Model Rules, supra note 95 and accompanying text. The ABA E2K
Commission recommended revising Rule 1.5 by adding a requirement that a
lawyer communicate fees, scope and expenses in writing. The Summary Report
from the ABA cryptically explained the vote by the House of Delegates as follows:
During the August 6-7, 2001 meeting of the American Bar Association
House of Delegates in Chicago, the House considered the changes to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed by the Commission
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000”).
The House voted on the Rules from the Preamble through Rule 1.10
and approved all of the Commission’s recommendations with the
following exceptions:
Rule 1.5: approved an amendment to delete the requirement of a
writing in Rule 1.5(b).
196. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 43. Pennell contends that the only way to
answer virtually all the questions is to put them in the engagement letter. If this is
done, it avoids a spillover of ancillary duties. Pennell suggests that this is the first,
last and best advice on the topic. Id.
197. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband
and Wife, 20 THE PROBATE LAWYER 15, 23 (1994), cited in ACTEC Commentaries,
supra note 110, at 177 (“There are basic principles of practice that apply when
concurrent representation is undertaken in any such situation . . . .”). See also
ACTEC, Engagement Letters: A Guide for Practitioners, supra note 147.
198. See, e.g., Reports of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility of
the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, 28
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 763 (1994).
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199

inconsistent.
The only source for what limited authority is
available is found in Restatement (Third) of the Law, and even
then it is hard to discern what constitutes a “likely
200
misunderstanding.”
In the last case study variation, where there is no writing,
privity (not specifically ethics but contracts), nor the waiver of it,
the attorney may be exposed to liability and the rights of nonparties asserting any action against the attorney must be examined.
This is done on a state-by-state basis because each state addresses
201
privity or any statutory equivalent differently.
When no
relationship to the Lawyer is expressed in writing, then the “default
202
rule” suggests that the only client of Lawyer is the fiduciary.
Here, the SNPT, Harrison, and the contingent beneficiaries of the
203
SNPT are not actually clients within a client-lawyer relationship.
The scope of the lawyer’s fiduciary and ethical boundaries
surrounding the client-lawyer relationship is expanding beyond the
privity construct when specifically applied in trusts and estates and
204
elder law practices. Concomitant with the expanding scope of
the client-lawyer relationship is the inclusion of the lawyer’s
fiduciary and ethical duties to those described as derivative clients,
205
“almost clients” or non-clients.
Nowhere will these expanding
boundaries of lawyering in trusts and estates and elder law have any
greater impact than in a trust situation as shown in the case study
206
variation involving Harrison, an elderly plaintiff and his family.
199. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 43.
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 163 (declaring that if there will be
likely misunderstanding without an engagement contract, then it is a requirement
of the attorney to make clear to those who are not clients that they are not
clients).
201. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 45.
204. Portions of this section were published by the author in FICKETT’ S
THICKET, supra note 102. See, e.g., Comment, Arizona Appellate Decisions 1976-77, VI.
Legal Profession, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 488, 653-671 (1977); Ronald C. Link et al.,
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The
Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. (1987).
205. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 110, at 772 (identifying those who are
beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships with lawyers as “almost clients”).
206. The accuracy of this assertion is shown in Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d
202 (Mich. 1996), where the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”),
at the time numbering thirty-three million members and serving Americans age
fifty and older, filed an amicus brief supporting judicial recognition of exceptions
to the privity doctrine in the will drafting context. AARP asserted that a majority
of states had already eliminated the requirement of privity in the will-drafting
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That Harrison, much less his family as contingent
beneficiaries, would ever be considered within the scope of
Lawyer’s duties is the result of pressure generated from many areas,
including two that are quite visible: (1) within the legal profession,
addressing the need for the legal profession to hold lawyers
accountable for legal services, including those of a fiduciary nature,
that harm or injure identifiable persons, or a limited class of
207
persons, intended by the client to benefit from the lawyer’s work;
and, (2) within the state courts, addressing the lawyer’s duty of care
beyond the lawyer’s privity relationship to those, other than the
208
client, receiving benefit from the client-lawyer relationship.
In the context of this article older people like Harrison are
growing in significant numbers. The expectations of this class of
older Americans may be one reason why lawyers’ scope of duties is
209
expanding. These older Americans are provided legal services
that include a vast array of products and documents that serve third
parties, and often address asset preservation options that transfer
assets to achieve tax avoidance and governmental benefits. The
elderly expect their legatees, beneficiaries, and intended recipients
to be properly served by the legal documents that their lawyers

context based on public policy concerns and recognition that the rationales
underlying the requirement are inapplicable. See Mieras v. DeBona, AARP Amicus
Brief, at 2-5. In the AARP amicus brief, statement of interest, the AARP confirmed
how important the issue was to older Americans:
Older people place their trust and the well-being of themselves and
their heirs in the hands of advisors, whether they are attorneys,
accountants, bankers, or financial planners, with the expectation that
these professionals possess the skills necessary to advise them and to
implement the decisions they make in reliance on this advice.
Attorneys who draft wills and who, due to their own negligence, fail to
take the steps necessary to carry out their clients’ wishes are in a
unique situation because their clients typically are dead by the time
their mistakes are discovered. Because neither the decedent nor his or
her estate can seek relief, these attorneys should be held liable to the
intended beneficiaries under the will, the only remaining parties truly
injured by the attorney’s acts or omissions. Allowing such liability is
the only way to provide meaningful redress for the attorney’s nowdeceased client and to deter future negligence by the attorney.
Mieras v. DeBona, AARP Amicus Brief, at 2.
207. See GREEN & COLEMAN, supra note 99, at 1001.
208. See Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility,
Counseling the Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR J. 825 (1994). See also Ross,
supra note 102 and accompanying text.
209. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002); supra text and
analysis accompanying note 189.
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210

create.
Additionally, the preparation must include the incorporation
into the lawyer’s habit of practice the choice of a client model,
identifying when it is appropriate to confirm the individual,
211
multiple, unit, or entity as the client. Once the model is chosen,
and the client identified, lawyers should reduce client engagements
to writing, explain the content, and have clients sign an
acceptance. As a part of the engagement document, lawyers also
should make it a habit of practice to understand how they may or
may not limit liability for delivery of services, or at least make
certain disclosures that the scope of their representation does not
212
include derivative clients, almost clients or non-clients.
There are strong opposing positions on whether expansion of
lawyer fiduciary and ethical duties should eliminate the doctrine of
213
privity.
The position opposing expansion asserts the general
argument that maintaining the doctrine of privity and barring
recovery by third parties is grounded in two perspectives: one that
the client creating the engagement should not lose control over
the lawyer and how the agreement is implemented, and the other
that contracting parties should not have imposed on them an
214
expanded burden or liability to the general public.
The position promoting expansion asserts the general
argument that eliminating the doctrine of privity and justifying
recovery by third parties is grounded in theories that include
215
negligence in tort, breach of contract relating to third party
216
beneficiaries, and a “hybrid” or multi-criteria combining contract
217
and tort.
210. See FICKETT’ S THICKET, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
211. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 50-59.
212. See Engagement Letters: A Guide for Practitioners, supra note 147, at 9, 19.
213. See Christopher H. Gadsden, Ethical Duties of Estate Planners–What Would
You Do?–Keeping Client Confidence, PROB. & PROP., 18 (Sept./Oct. 1995).
214. See Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to
Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, 473475 (1988); Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney’s Liability to one Other than Immediate
Client for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, 625, 639
(1988); Patrick Emery Longan, Middle-Class Lawyering in the Age of Alzheimer’s: The
Lawyer’s Duties in Representing a Fiduciary, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 901 (2001).
215. See Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
216. See Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981).
217. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962). Examples of the opposing views were highlighted in case studies by
Lawrence Fox and Christopher Gadsden in a recent issue of Probate and Property,
the magazine of the Real Property Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar
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The ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2 asserts the general
principle that the lawyer and client are “relatively free to define the
scope and objectives of representation, including the extent to which
information will be shared among multiple clients and the nature
218
and extent of the obligations that the lawyer will have to the client.”
As far as multiple clients are concerned, the commentary describes
the lawyer’s responsibility to discuss with the client the functions of a
219
personal representative, trustee or other fiduciary, making it clear
that the lawyer should discuss with the client or clients the lawyer’s
role in representing fiduciaries in administrative functions, including
the possibility that the lawyer may owe duties to the beneficiaries with
the resulting benefit in better equipping clients to select and give
220
directions to fiduciaries.
As part of the general rule, the commentary states that
beneficiaries should be told by the lawyer that the fiduciary has
engaged a lawyer and that the fiduciary is the client, explaining
further that while at times beneficiaries will receive information
regarding the fiduciary estate, the lawyer does not represent them,
and the beneficiaries should consider retaining independent counsel
221
to represent their interests.
The commentary goes on to explain that when a lawyer
represents a fiduciary of an estate, there should be no attempt to
diminish or eliminate by agreement with the fiduciary the duties the
lawyer may otherwise owe to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate
222
without first giving them notice.
The commentary acknowledges that many circumstances may
Association. See Gadsden, supra note 213; Lawrence J. Fox, Ethical Duties of Estate
Planners--What Would You Do?--Liability Squared, PROB. & PROP., 19 (Sept./Oct.
1995).
218. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 50.
219. Id. at 51.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 51-52.
222. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 56-57 (the commentaries
give an example that
without first giving notice to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate, a
lawyer should not agree with a fiduciary not to disclose to the
beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate any acts or omissions on the part of
fiduciary that the lawyer would otherwise be permitted or required to
disclose to the beneficiaries. In jurisdictions that permit the lawyer for
a fiduciary to make such disclosures, [a] lawyer generally should not
give up the opportunity to make such disclosures where the lawyer
determines the disclosures are needed to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries.
Id.
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vary the nature and extent of the lawyer’s duties to the beneficiaries
223
of the fiduciary estate. Although largely restrictive in nature, it is
noteworthy that the commentary declares that the lawyer for the
224
fiduciary owes some duties to non-client beneficiaries, and at times,
protection of the interests of the beneficiaries may require the
affirmative action of the lawyer. The commentary makes reference to
the characterization of beneficiaries as derivative or secondary clients
225
of the lawyer for the fiduciary, providing another example relating
to duties to beneficiaries:
[A] lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary individually may
owe few, if any, duties to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary
estate other than ones the lawyer owes to other third
parties. Thus, a lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary to
advise the fiduciary regarding the fiduciary’s defense to an
action brought against the fiduciary by a beneficiary may
have no duties to the beneficiaries 226
beyond those due to
other adverse parties or nonclients.
On the premise that estate planning and estate administration
are fundamentally nonadversarial in nature, the commentary on
Model Rule 1.7 asserts that when estate planning goals of multiple
clients are not entirely consistent, it does not necessarily preclude the
227
lawyer from representing them. This conclusion is rationalized by
the fact that “[a]dvising related clients who have somewhat different
goals may be consistent with their interests and the lawyer’s
traditional role as a lawyer for the ‘family,’” and may prove to be the
228
most cost effective representation in achieving the objectives.
Multiple client representation regarding related matters often
involves impermissible conflicts, including ones that affect the
interest of third parties, or even the lawyer’s own interests. While
keeping this in mind, a lawyer who continues with a representation
that involves tolerable conflicts at the outset may have to respond to
changing conditions that make the conflicts intolerable by ending the
client-lawyer relationship subject to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2, which
address conflict of interest and intermediary representation,

223. Id. at 57.
224. Id.; see also ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 60-77, (providing case
citations from every state and the District of Columbia omitted).
225. Supra note 110, at 57.
226. Id. at 57-58.
227. Id. at 154.
228. Id. at 150.
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229

respectively.
The commentary gives two additional examples
related to estate planning which are used later in this article as the
230
basis for more descriptive case studies.
231
Biakanja v. Irving, was the first case to make a dent in the
doctrine of privity. Since then, the doctrine of privity has been

229. Id. at 153-54. The commentary notes that in some states certain services
require independent representation or otherwise may be invalidated. On the
other hand, the commentary notes that if “necessary preconditions are met, a
lawyer may, with informed consent of the parties, represent both parties to a
transaction, such as the formation of a business enterprise, the execution of an
employment agreement or a buy-sell agreement, or a joint spousal election to split
gifts.” Id. Note that Rule 2.2 has been repealed with its substance incorporated in
to Comments to Rule 1.7.
230. Id. at 153. Example 1.7-2 illustrates:
Lawyer (L) represents Trustee (T) as trustee of a trust created by X. L
may properly represent T in connection with other matters that do not
involve a conflict of interest, such as the preparation of a will or other
personal matters not related to the trust. L should not charge the
trust for any personal services that are performed for T. Moreover, in
order to avoid misunderstandings, L should charge T for any
substantial personal services that L performs for T.
Id. See also, Example 1.7-3:
Lawyer (L) represented Husband (H) and Wife (W) jointly with
respect to estate planning matters. H died leaving a will that appointed
Bank (B) as executor and as trustee of a trust for the benefit of W that
meets the QTIP requirements under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). L has agreed
to represent B and knows that W looks to him as her lawyer. L may
represent both B and W if the requirements of MRPC 1.7 are met. If a
serious conflict arises between B and W, L may be required to withdraw
as counsel for B or W or both. L may inform W of her elective share,
support, homestead or other rights under the local law without
violating MRPC 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client). However,
without the informed consent of all affected parties L should not
represent W in connection with an attempt to set aside H’s will or to
assert an elective share.
Id.
231. 320 P.2d 16, 18-19 (Cal. 1958). Biakanja is considered the leading case
that rejected the privity requirement, allowing the intended beneficiary to
recovery against the defendant notary public who incorrectly attested a will that
was denied probate; see also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), cert.
den. 386 U.S. 987:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
forseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, . . . and the policy of
preventing future harm.
Id. at 650.
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232

thoroughly examined in many state jurisdictions.
A majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the privity
doctrine in the context of trusts and estates have not adhered to it
when examining third party, non-client malpractice, or liability
233
against lawyers. However, the demise of the doctrine of privity is
234
far from complete. While possibly moving from the doctrine of
privity in the future, there are still many appellate court decisions
235
that recognize it, even in the trusts and estates context.
The
232. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 154–66, 242-96 (West
Pub. Co. 1986).
233. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577-578 (Tex. 1996), citing Lucas v.
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987(1962); Stowe v.
Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062
(D.C. 1983); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ogle
v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 226-27 (Ill. 1984); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968,
968 (Ind. 1988); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v.
Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990); In re Killingsworth, 292 So.2d 536, 542 (La.
1973); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292-93 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 459
A.2d 744, 751-53 (Pa. 1983); Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 327
(Wis. 1983). But see Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1983); Viscardi v.
Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662, 663-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986); Simon v.
Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) (The court further explained that
although several states allowed intended beneficiaries a broad cause of action,
citing Stowe, 441 A.2d at 84; Ogle, 80 Ill.Dec. at 775, 466 N.E.2d at 227; and Hale,
744 P.2d at 1293, it cited other state courts limiting the class of plaintiffs to
beneficiaries specifically identified in an invalid will or trust, citing Ventura
County Humane Society v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 903-04 (1974); DeMaris,
426 So.2d at 1154; Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 683 (The court identified this case as
an example of when “a cause of action ordinarily will arise only when as a direct
result of the lawyer’s professional negligence the testator’s intent as expressed in
the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary’s
interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized”); Kirgan v. Parks,
478 A.2d 713, 718-19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)(holding that, if cause of action
exists, it does not extend to situation where testator’s intent as expressed in the
will has been carried out); Ginther v. Zimmerman, 491 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992); Guy, 459 A.2d at 751-52.
234. See Bruce S. Ross, Legal Malpractice and Estate Planning and Administration,
18 ACTEC Notes 240-248, 250-51 (1992)(acknowledging that the “dragon of
‘privity,’ applied to bar a malpractice claim for the alleged negligent drafting of a
testamentary instrument, has not been slain, although the cases are short on
discussion of the theoretical justification for the continued application of the
doctrine”).
235. See Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 580 n.1 (dissenting opinion of Cornyn,
identifying courts that still adhere to the privity doctrine, citing Williams v. Bryan,
Cave, McPheeters and McRoberts, 774 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); St.
Mary’s Church v. Tomek, 325 N.W.2d 164, 165 (1982); Viscardi v. Lerner, 510
N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987).
In addition to the above referenced states of Missouri, Nebraska, New York and
Ohio, the states of Washington, Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994),
Texas, Barcelo., 923 S.W.2d at 575, and Illinois, Rutkowski v. Hollis, 600 N.E.2d
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236

Texas Supreme Court decision, Barcelo v. Elliott, is an example of
the retreat to the bright-line privity rule, denying a cause of action
to beneficiaries of a trust whom the attorney for the settlor did not
represent. However, the Michigan Supreme Court decision, Mieras
237
v. DeBona, is an example of the rejection of the doctrine of privity
relating to beneficiaries of a will whom the drafting attorney never
represented.
(2) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment
In the Harrison variation, the state’s case law and ethics
opinions will weigh greatly on Lawyer’s exposure to liability coming
from losses and exorbitant fees and commissions assessed not by
Lawyer, but by CeteBank and the NPA, CareGivers, Inc. One final
point, if Lawyer and SNT Specialist have not fully explained to
Harrison’s wife and children why any remainder corpus in the
SNPT beyond Harrison’s life goes to the NPA, CareGivers, Inc.,
then they may be exposed to liability if the family prevails in causes
of action as derivative clients.
d. The NPA or Consumer Disability Advocacy Group as
Client
While the NPA is defined by federal and state law and the trust
document as trustee, it usually is not. Most of the time, the NPA
will be involved because of its disabled members or customers and
238
its mission and goals of individual advocacy for the elderly. As
discussed earlier in the article, a mandatory element of the SNPT
comes from the way in which federal and state laws have defined
239
who the trustee must be.
The trustee must be a nonprofit
association (NPA) serving the advocacy, case management, and
care giving needs of the trust beneficiary. In the ordinary course of
trust and estate development and administration, the institutional,
financial or corporate trustee is the norm. Institutional trustees
function within the institutional banking and trust environment,
analytically focused on the corpus of the SNPT. These institutional
trustees invest and manage assets, and administer the receipts and
1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) are identified as states supporting the privity doctrine in
the trusts and estates context.
236. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 575.
237. 550 N.W.2d at 202.
238. See supra note 46.
239. See supra note 33.
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disbursements of the trust through periodic accountings mandated
during the life of the SNPT.
The NPA trustee is a much stranger duck. The more that it is
240
utilized, the stranger it seems to get.
Often, the NPA has no
institutional banking, trust or fiduciary alignment. However, it
needs constant assistance from some financial source to handle the
managed funds under trust and properly account for receipts and
241
disbursements.
Additionally, NPAs being sought to carry trust
responsibilities of SNPTs seek legal assistance from lawyers to
provide them, as NPA trustees, with legal counsel for trust
administration, distribution of funds, and attending to the
complexities of benefits eligibility, especially when the benefits are
242
means-tested like that of Medicaid or SSI.
(1) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.7–General Rule
Using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier commentary
on other relationships, several factual variations are briefly
examined for the readers to carefully consider.
There are times when the SNT Specialist is the same person
that has been hired by Lawyer to provide SNT documents and assist
in moving the NPA into position to serve the interests of someone
like Harrison. There is a potential for SNT Specialist to have her
loyalties diluted between the NPA that she has assisted and worked
with for decades, and Harrison. Of course, if SNT Specialist has
expressly declared her client-lawyer relationship with Lawyer, then
there is no direct relationship with Harrison. However, Lawyer is
clearly Harrison’s attorney, and if he is at all aware of the tangled
relationship between SNT Specialist, the NPA, and Harrison, then
what is his duty? Does he have a duty to do anything about SNT
Specialist’s divided loyalties? The current answer, based on the
qualified assumptions above, is no. Lawyer does not have a duty to
do anything about SNT Specialist’s connection to the NPA because
there has yet to be anything shown or asserted that would be
240. This is the author’s opinion based on the only available information on
those visible NPAs that are either created by groups advocating the interests of
their members, see supra note 46, or religious groups attempting to serve
parishioners and “the least of these our bretheren.” Matthew 25:40.
241. See supra note 46, and accompanying text and analysis. NPAs do not have
the financial experience to properly account for the investment of assets under
management in the pooled umbrella construct that is mandataed by the law; see
also supra note 33.
242. See supra note 46; supra note 33.
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considered sufficient adversity to trigger notice, disclosure, and
243
written waiver.
(2) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment
Again, using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier
commentary on other relationships, the factual variation discussed
in relation to independent judgment is examined within the
context of independent judgment for the readers to carefully
consider.
As in an earlier variation, assume that in her practice, SNT
Specialist has had her firm habitually maintain the administration
of SNTs and SNPTs. In Harrison’s case, SNT Specialist’s firm
provides legal counseling to the NPA, Caregivers, Inc., and assists
the institutional entity (CeteBank) with standard trust
administrative services for both, all at a time when Harrison is no
longer her client, if he ever was.
It should be obvious that SNT Specialist’s loyalties might be
divided between CeteBank and CareGivers. SNT Specialist must
weigh potential adversity in determining whether or not CeteBank
and CareGivers need to be given notice, to be provided full
disclosure, and to be asked to sign acknowledgement of waivable
244
conflicts. It may not be so clear that SNT Specialist must also pay
attention to Rule 1.9, addressing the protections of her prior client,
245
Harrison. If SNT Specialist has complied with Rule 1.9, having
246
Harrison sign a written waiver, if allowed, then what happens if
something goes awry that damages Harrison? Where do the fees
come from that pay for correcting the problem created by SNT
Specialist, CeteBank or CareGivers? Does SNT Specialist expect to
be paid for working out the damages that have befallen Harrison
247
when the damages may have been SNT Specialist’s fault?
For example, assume a variation in the facts where CeteBank
used SNPT assets under management to purchase an annuity
product of “Life Long Benefits”, a subsidiary. Life Long Benefits
presented an invoice to CareGivers for payment of the annuity.
Caregivers sent the invoice to Cetebank. CeteBank verified and
243. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. See 2002 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 96, at 44-46,
Comments 8-9; see ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 201-203.
246. Id.
247. See generally Pennell, supra note 86.
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paid the invoice. In addition to the invoice on the front end of the
annuity, Life Long Benefits confirmed in writing to Caregivers, with
a copy to SNT Specialist, that the rate of return on the annuity was
variable; that it would be charging standard periodic administrative
fees throughout the term of the annuity; and the annuity was life
with no guaranteed period of payout certainty. Unknown to SNT
Specialist, Life Long Benefits invested most of its managed funds in
technology and energy stocks. Before the year was over, the annuity
was worthless. That was about the time that certain accounting
adjustments were made by CeteBank, and subsequently sent to SNT
Specialist in the periodic statement and accounting of the corpus
of the SNPT. However, SNT Specialist was off in the next big
personal injury case where she was to develop another SNPT. She
was not looking at what was being sent to here to be placed in the
Harrison file, and neither was her staff, simply sticking the
accounting in the file.
CeteBank Banker took the executive director of CareGivers
and a SNT Specialist to lunch shortly after the filing of the
accounting, explaining that reversals in the economy and the
significant downturn in the markets would reflect badly on the
corpus of the SNPT. He suggested, however, that it was going on
everywhere and was unavoidable. In the same breath, CeteBank
Banker begins discussing a marketing plan to help “get the word
out” about the virtues of Caregivers as an NPA and the benefits of
SNPTs. He explains that CeteBank is offering a very attractive
equity line to fund the marketing campaign, to be used when
necessary for Caregivers and SNT Specialist to cover expenses and
salaries.
(3) Violation of Client Confidences
Again, using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier
commentary on other relationships, the factual variation discussed
in relation to client confidences is examined within the context of
client confidences for the readers to carefully consider.
As in an earlier variation, assume that in her practice, SNT
Specialist has had her firm habitually maintain the administration
of SNTs and SNPTs. In Harrison’s case, SNT Specialist’s firm
provides legal counseling to the NPA, Caregivers, Inc., and assists
the institutional entity (CeteBank) with standard trust
administrative services for both, all at a time when Harrison is no
longer her client, if he ever was.
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In this variation, CeteBank Banker has been having
conversations with SNT Specialist, banker explains that Life Long
Benefits will be going out of business and CeteBank will not be
covering the failure of annuities such as the one in the Harrison
SNPT. This will completely gut the corpus of Harrison’s SNPT and
he will have no supplemental support. Further, Caregivers will
receive no fees or have any corpus at the end of the SNPT from
which to benefit. To make matters worse, in an attempt to reduce
its deficit, the State has begun to file claims against SNPTs for
Medicaid Estate Recovery or for Medicaid Payback. Harrison calls
SNT Specialist’s paralegal, demanding to know what happened to
his million-dollar trust fund. The paralegal had worked with
Harrison during the year that the SNPT was under administration.
He blurts out the whole story. Harrison meets with SNT Specialist.
She confirms what the paralegal told Harrison, but points the
finger at Caregivers and CeteBank. She also explains that she was
not Harrison’s attorney when the SNPT was negotiated, she was
Lawyer’s attorney and he should take it up with Lawyer.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examined the self-settled special needs pooled
trust, a relatively new option available to elder law attorneys, estate
and trust lawyers, and other legal practitioners serving disabled or
injured elderly clients. It first gave a brief summary of the
discretionary support trust, and how the special needs pooled trust
evolved. The brief history was followed by a summary of the
components of the d4C special needs pooled trust (SNPT), with a
summary analysis of how to operate the trust in compliance with
Medicaid eligibility. The article then examined revisions to the
Model Rules of Professional responsibility, applying several of them
to various initial client-lawyer engagements where the trust
Specialist is being engaged to design, implement, and fund an
SNPT, raising questions of lawyer loyalty and conflict of interest,
confidentiality and privity running running to the trustee, the
beneficiary or both.
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